12 APR 2012

FROM: President and CEO, BRZ, Inc.
TO: Concurrent Technologies Corporation (CTC) SAP-A Contract Managers
SUBJECT: Mid-Phase Review of U.S. Army's Operational Test of the Safety Awareness Program – Aviation (SAP-A)

The following document provides a mid-phase review of the U.S. Army's operational test of the SAP-A safety management system (SMS) powered by BRZ, Inc.'s PULSE+© software. This document is structured to not only meet contractual reporting requirements, but to provide information to SAP-A users to validate their participation and encourage their continued cooperation. The first portion of this document is for administrative review purposes and the second portion is a newsletter that can be made available to all SAP-A users. The time period covered by this review is 6 FEB 2012 through 12 APR 2012.

SAP-A Operational Test Mid-Phase Executive Summary: The Army's operational test of SAP-A began on 6 FEB 2012 with an in-brief to the Commander of the 3rd CAB (host for the SAP-A Ops Test) followed by eight days of briefings and training for 3rd CAB personnel and other invited guests or support organizations. This training included separate courses for Safety Officers, unit level users, and support organizations. Each participating unit was provided a thorough briefing on use of the SAP-A tool and given supporting training materials including PowerPoint briefings and quick reference job aids. Upon completing all required training, the 3rd CAB Commander was briefed on program status at which time he granted approval to commence the test. SAP-A data collection and reporting activities began on 16 FEB 2012 and will continue until the end of June 2012.

SAP-A Participation:

3rd CAB - 115 Out Of 163 Total => 70.6% Reviewed [342 Total Records]			
1-3 ARB	96.0%	(24 / 25) Needing Review	77 Total Records
2-3 GSAB	62.7%	(69 / 110) Needing Review	163 Total Records
3-17 CAV	50.0%	(1 / 2) Needing Review	11 Total Records
4-3 AHB	88.9%	(8 / 9) Needing Review	29 Total Records
603 ASB	--	No Reports Entered	4 Total Records
CGAS SAV	71.4%	(10 / 14) Needing Review	55 Total Records
HAAF	100.0%	(3 / 3) Needing Review	3 Total Records

User participation in SAP-A continues to grow with the 2-3 GSAB leading the effort and sustaining high participation levels. The variability of unit participation is higher than the historical norm for other organizations initiating similar programs. However, this may be due to other higher priority activities associated with real-world operational tasking. The quality of reports with comments is good and the ratio of no-event to event reports is considered normal (Total Reports: 342; Event Reports with Comments: 159 [46%]; No-Event Reports: 183 [54%])

Information Dissemination Efforts: There have been two specific documents supplied to CTC by BRZ, Inc. to facilitate communication of SAP-A operational test information:

- An Executive Summary of U.S. Army SAP-A Operational Test Activities from 16 FEB – 9 MAR 2012, and
- A separate report in a "Quarterly SAP-A Update" format for 2-3 GSAB from 16 FEB-24 MAR 2012 to highlight the valuable information their strong participation has yielded.

These reports have been augmented by numerous e-mail and telephonic information transfers between BRZ, Inc. and CTC representatives to deal with programmatic issues.

SAP-A Mid-Phase Operational Test Newsletter: Provided with this document is a SAP-A Update Newsletter for dissemination to all SAP-A operational test participants. Once approved, this newsletter will be posted on the SAP-A website and Safety Officers are encouraged to print this document and post it on Company/Squadron bulletin boards. The articles included in this newsletter are related to the reports submitted by SAP-A users. These articles expand upon issues of concern expressed by SAP-A users in their report narratives. The information provided is designed to increase the requisite knowledge of SAP-A users and, in some cases, provide enhanced skill set development that can help to reduce the cumulative "chronic stress" associated with operational irritants. The newsletter is structured to provide: a brief summary of the time frame being reviewed; articles relating to specific areas highlighted during the reporting period; a look at program participation; charts showing overall areas of concern; the top four categories for the command; analysis of the top four categories; and the types of human errors highlighted by SAP-A reports.

3rd CAB SAP-A Data Collection and Reporting To-Date:

- **3rd CAB SAP-A Reports by Category Percentage Comparisons**:



- **3rd CAB SAP-A Report Showing Most Active Categories in Ranked Order:**



- **3rd CAB Top-Four SAP-A Categories Showing Most Active Sub-Categories:**



- **Analysis of 3rd CAB Top Four Categories:**
  1. **Maintenance Category**: Total Reports = 47

- System Failure (43%)
- Mx Pers/Equip/Parts (17%)
- Acft Not Ready (15%)
- Degraded Ops: (15%)

Analysis: Several of the reports shown in the Maintenance portion of the SAP-A Supporting Documents Section below reflect the normal challenges associated with daily military flight operations. There are however, some issues that may require additional attention:

- The repetitive illumination of false warning or caution lights for critical systems such as fire/overheat or flight control power control units not only induces an undesirable distraction, but left unchecked, begins to desensitize aviators to an actual event. SAP-A reports currently show that aviators are doing an excellent job of checking secondary indications to substantiate the primary problem. However, history has shown that routine exposure to false warning or caution indications will eventually result in aviators assigning a lower priority to these "nuisance events" that can lead to a catastrophe. Maintenance personnel must clearly understand that operable warning and caution indications are an integral part of safe operations and that repetitive "could not duplicate" maintenance sign-offs are not acceptable.
- Reports in this category also highlight:
  - A perception that maintenance is struggling to supply enough airworthy aircraft to meet the schedule.
  - A concern that line maintenance may be undermanned.
  - Issues with maintainers failing to complete maintenance procedures correctly and not properly documenting work,
  - A perception that maintainers are unable to secure required maintenance consumables due to budget constraints. **NOTE**: Concerns over maintenance budgets surfaced during initial SAP-A training when several maintenance supervisors complained that lacking a credit offset for turned-in parts and materials, they were afraid their ability to sustain aircraft generation would be adversely impacted.
- One report concerns what aviators believe to be a reoccurring problem with refuelers beginning cold fueling operations with aviators in the cockpit.
- The fact that the maintenance category contains the most SAP-A reports indicates its importance to aircrews. Aircrew confidence in maintenance is essential to readiness; increased scrutiny and support for maintenance quality assurance efforts may help reduce maintenance reports.

2. **Communication Category**: Total Reports = 28
   - Controlling Agency (50%)
   - Air to Ground (21%)
   - Air-to-Air (14%)

   Analysis: The majority of reports in this area indicate that aircraft operating in the Western ranges have problems communicating with MARNE radio. This problem should be shared with the base operations management team who work closely with the COMM/NAV people. Many of the communication issues highlighted by SAP-A reports may be remedied by an alignment adjustment of the Marne radio antenna to redirect reception lobes, or may require a radio repeater to be placed on the western edge of the working areas.

- Reports on problems with maintaining radio and radar contact with JAX Center are similar to those experienced by other services operating in the area. JAX Center has traditionally had problems with low altitude radar coverage and radio reception. Sharing these reports with JAX Center might help them remedy the problem or at least offer some operational suggestions. Since this problem affects multiple services, it may best be addressed by working groups at the DoD level.
- Reports indicate a real barrier to communication being created by crews using range or area hailing frequencies for air-to-air flight communications. This activity not only blocks traffic information, but could easily result in "stepped-on" or blocked communication between formation aircraft at a critical time.

3. **Weather/Environmental Category**: Total Reports = 23
   - Forecast Accuracy (26%)
   - Visibility/Ceiling (26%)
   - Severe Weather: (26%)

   Analysis: All aviators know that weather forecasting is part science and part "educated guess". But it seems the quality of the weather briefings being received by 3rd CAB crews may not be of the quality necessary for proper mission planning. There are numerous reports of weather being well below that forecast, and even one where the weather was significantly better than the forecast. Forecasting weather is a difficult job, especially in the Southeast United States, but crews are starting to become uncomfortable with the accuracy of their weather briefs. It's obvious as you read the attached reports that one aviator in particular is upset about the adequacy of briefings, but the majority of the problem seems to revolve around accuracy. It might prove beneficial to share this section of this report with weather personnel to let them know how their customers view their product.
   - Two reports point out a shortfall in the existing NOTAM system in regards to controlled burns. These reports provide an excellent idea of adding the time and location of controlled burns to range NOTAMS to help with mission planning – a good idea and a quick fix.

4. **Unsafe Practices Category**: Total Reports = 14
   - Ground Equipment (29%)
   - Personnel (29%)

   Analysis: Perhaps one of the more interesting reports in this period had to do with aviators witnessing fueling personnel failing to ground the refueling hose, but waiting until fueling was complete to bring it to their attention. This is a good example of two human factors errors in one event; an "**omission error**" on the part of the fuelers for missing a grounding step in their checklist, and a "**timing error**" on the part of the crew for not stopping the operation to correct a potentially dangerous situation.

- **Human Factors – Threat and Error Management**: The following chart shows the type of errors highlighted by SAP-A reports. By using a broad, upper level analysis of four common types of HF errors, it is hoped that the information can be acted upon at the Battalion or Company levels to correct identified issues. The types of errors highlighted are errors of:

- **C**ommission: Performed a task or procedure incorrectly (i.e. activated the wrong switch during completion of a checklist); applicable report identified with (C),
- **O**mission: Forgot or failed to complete a required task or procedure (i.e. missed a checklist item); applicable report identified with (O),
- **P**recision: Unable to perform a task or procedure within acceptable parameters (i.e. was unable to hover while on NVGs); applicable report identified with (P), and
- **T**iming: Accomplished a task or procedure at the wrong time (i.e. started down too early on an approach); applicable report identified with (T).

Key

AV = Aviator(s)

CGAS = U.S. Coast Guard Input

GP = Ground Personnel

MX = Maintenance

R-# = "R" stands for "report" and the subsequent number (#) is the actual database number of the report to facilitate search activities.

OMISSION (O)	COMMISSION (C)	PRECISION (P)	TIMING (T)
R-2: ATC (no info to conflicting acft)	R-8: AV OH-58 overflew known departing traffic	R-31/-187/-188 : WX GP did not provide adequate wx briefs (repeat issue)	None Reported
R-43: Comm to base ops about 12 arriving OH-58s	R-9: GP driving gator did not use eye protection	R-72: Tower gave unneeded delaying vectors	
R-67: MX forgot to re-attach avionics plug or make logbook entry	R-83: Fuelers began cold refueling with crew onboard: repeat issue	R-105: Interface problem between ATC agencies; procedural issue	
R-281: Tower forgot to tell acft about lightening warning in area	R-84: MX personnel conflict over SOP about the use of scamp support footers	R-151: FARP did not follow SOPs, and over-fueled acft	
	R-85: NG AV using area freq as common	R-178: Tower controller's SA of acft locations poor	
	R-90: Civ GP driving yellow fuel truck too fast	R-262: CGAS AV AFCS off landing – wrong pedal input by aviator	
	R-137: Law Enforcement helicopter stalking acft too close		
	R-141: FARP personnel not following SOPs and not wearing protective gear		
	R-189: GP towing conflict with taxiing acft		
	R-229: AVs: 3 CH47's not communicating in area or following SOPs		
	R-261: CGAS FMI did unbriefed comm-out exercise during hoist		
	R-297: AVs not using A-to-A frequency properly		

	R-328: Boat unit failed to take into account winds in selected ops area which adversely affected the conduct of SAR training exercise		
	R-343 – Base Ops failed to file correct flight plan		
4	**14**	**8**	**0**

- **SAP-A Supporting Documents:**

  1. Maintenance:

Feb 2012	*C-2-3 / 7*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Maintenance*	*System Failure*

FLIGHT WAS NOT COMPLETED AS ASSIGNED DUE TO FAILURE OF COMPONENTS. LANDING LIGHT BURNED OUT HALF WAY THROUGH FLIGHT AND THE STABILATOR FAILED IN THE AUTO MODE.

Feb 2012	*C-2-3 / 22*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Maintenance*	*System Failure*

AMR CANCELLED DUE TO MAINTENANCE. IN PROCESS OF AVIONICS CHECK AND THE APU GENERATOR SHUT DOWN. INITIAL DIAGNOSIS IS APU GENERATOR SHAFT SHEARED.

Feb 2012	*A-2-3 / 30*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Maintenance*	*System Failure*

Fire light illuminated in flight 4 different times. Light extinguished after no more than 1 second. Crew verified no fire was present, continued mission.

Feb 2012	*C-2-3 / 32*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Maintenance*	*System Failure*

Flight was a D/N/NG progression flight. The first portion of the flight was uneventful. During the second portion under NG, on return to HAAF the landing light burnt out on Little Neck transition. The flight was cut short due to the landing light burning out.

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 38*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Maintenance*	*Aircrew Delay*

due to limited personnel a the time, flight was delayed due to crew chief being tasked with moving an aircraft. We have limited crew chiefs qualifed on the tug.

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 50*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Maintenance*	*Acft Not Ready*

Mission canceled due to main rotor tip cap worn beyond limits. Fault due to insufficient funds IOT purchase paint to keep blade painted. Tip cap must be replaced.

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 53*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Maintenance*	*Acft Not Ready*

Flight cancelled for maintenance, tip cap found unserviceable.

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 55*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Maintenance*	*System Failure*

FPS caution light accompanied by gyro capsule light came on during flight 2 times. Was able to reset each time. Then during shutdown at generator change over FPS and gyro light came back on. MTP went out and was not able to duplicate.

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 61*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Maintenance*	*Acft Not Ready*

Departure delayed to verify the status of a partially disbonded fore primary servo washer.

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 64*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Maintenance*	*Mx Pers/Equip/Parts*

Flight canceled due to maintence. A/C would not come into tolerences durning track and balance and needed a Main rotor blade replaced.

Mar 2012	*B-2-3 / 67*	*Aviator*	*CH-47D*	*Maintenance*	*Acft Not Ready*

During run-up both the pilot and copilots VGI were not operational. The FE inspected the vertical gyros and they were found to be unplugged. He plugged them in and they were operational. If something is done to the aircraft it should have a -1 and -2 entrys in the log book.

Mar 2012	*B-2-3 / 68*	*Aviator*	*CH-47D*	*Maintenance*	*System Failure*

While taxiing the tower called us and notified us of smoke coming from our aircraft. I looked out the pilots window and noticed it was coming from the heater and immediately shut it off. FE inspected the heater for any internal fires, non were found so we continued mission without the heater.

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 74*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Maintenance*	*Mx Pers/Equip/Parts*

#1 engine fire light illuminated multiple times throughout flight while flying west. Fire conditions were verified as non-existant, and mission was continued.

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 76*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Maintenance*	*Mx Pers/Equip/Parts*

Cancelled due to maintence.

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 77*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Maintenance*	*Mx Pers/Equip/Parts*

Flight cancled due to lack of aircraft. Again

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 78*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Maintenance*	*System Failure*

Flight was scheduled but the aircraft was down for maintenance

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 80*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Maintenance*	*Acft Not Ready*

Switched from aircraft 26711 to aircraft 26574 due to maintenance

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 83*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Maintenance*	*Fueling Issue/ FARP Ops*

At EOM, the refuelers arrived promptly but began cold fueling the aircraft with the pilots still inside working on radio issues. This is not the first time its been noticed that they havent made sure the aircraft is clear of all personnel both inside, on top of and the doors closed prior to refueling. The fuelers were spoken to and corrected on the spot yet after the servicing had already begun.

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 97*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Maintenance*	*Acft Not Ready*

Had to jump to another aircraft due to position light inop. Replaced bulb and troubleshot but could not fix.

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 108*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Maintenance*	*Degraded Operations*

VOR indications were unreliable during IFR training. Used GPS to fly intruments.

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 109*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Maintenance*	*Mx Pers/Equip/Parts*

SEFS mods did not come with a blank plate. Auxillary fuel panel was removed with no plate in place

Mar 2012	*B-2-3 / 110*	*Aviator*	*CH-47D*	*Maintenance*	*Degraded Operations*

No comment, mission complete

Mar 2012	*B-1-3 / 122*	*Aviator*	*AH-64D*	*Maintenance*	*Mx Pers/Equip/Parts*

Right main landing brakes were very weak causing the aircraft to vear left when the crew attempted to test the brakes.

Mar 2012	*C-1-3 / 141*	*Aviator*	*AH-64D*	*Maintenance*	*Fueling Issue/ FARP Ops*

FARP personnel at HAAF approached the aircraft prior to anti-collision lights being switched off. The pad chief was not wearing gloves, and the refueler began filling the forward tank first.

Mar 2012	*CGAS-1 / 143*	*Aviator*	*HH-65*	*Maintenance*	*System Failure*

While transitioning from a 100' air taxi into a 50' hover (using the CG41428 as a reference), PAC (left seat, PIC) noted a "MGB PMP MAIN" light flicker twice and then solidly illuminate on the WCA panel. PAC announced the light while simultaneously transitioning to forward flight. PNAC called backed up PAC on the instruments for the climb out and, once safely away from the water, noted the VEMD Vehicle Page for transmission indications. Both pressure and temperature were in the normal range, and indicated appx 29psi and 78 degrees C, respectively. After agreeing on the EP as "MGB Pump Main element failure", PAC called for the FM to break out the redbook. PNAC (right seat) proceeded to make radio calls to Sector CHS, Savannah Air, and Hunter Tower. Crew did not declare an emergency with tower due to normal transmission parameters w/ no secondary indications. Executed normal running landing to the contact pad and taxied back to the CG ramp for shutdown.

Mar 2012	*B-1-3 / 150*	*Aviator*	*AH-64D*	*Maintenance*	*Repeat Discrepancy*

CPG Intermitten Canopy Open message throughout flight.

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 158*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Maintenance*	*Degraded Operations*

T/R chip caution appeared. Aircraft landed safely, and was recovered to HAAF on a one time flight.

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 170*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Maintenance*	*System Failure*

unable to complete mission due to sister ship precautionary landing for tail rotor chip light. We remained onsight as DART aircraft. Aircraft was able to have a one time evacuation flight back to base with no problems

Mar 2012	*B-4-3 / 185*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Maintenance*	*Mx Pers/Equip/Parts*

During takeoff after hot refuel, aircrew smelled fumes from fuel. They did a precautionary landing and emergency engine shutdown on aircraft 26-722. Crew discovered fuel leak on number 2 engine and turned aircraft over to maintenence. No fuel was spilled.

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 208*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Maintenance*	*Acft Not Ready*

Original Aircraft issued was found to be red x'd, first portion of flight was cancelled due to maintenance. Second flight jumped aircraft and flew 2.5 of the 4.0 hours allotted. IFF caution and Master Caution appeared continuously throughout flight. Pilot side HUD was found to be inop. Otherwise great flight.

Mar 2012	*B-1-3 / 222*	*Aviator*	*AH-64D*	*Maintenance*	*Degraded Operations*

Radar Altimeter works intermittenly. Did not cancell flight.

Mar 2012	*CGAS-1 / 224*	*Aviator*	*HH-65*	*Maintenance*	*Degraded Operations*

Training flight/pattern beater for pilots. After eight uneventful go-arounds in the pattern, began no-hover takeoffs. On first take-off's powerpull, as the FLI reached 8.5, it instantaneously increased to 9.5-9.9, then instantaneously went back down to 8.5. We aborted the take-off, discussed it, decided to try it again to see if the same results would happen. On second no-hover take-off, same results occured. Decided to abort the rest of the flight due to the unusual FLI indications. Taxied back to ramp. As we were beginning to go through shut-down checklist, noticed the #2 engine cowling was popped open.

Mar 2012	*A-4-3 / 252*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Maintenance*	*System Failure*

Main transmission chip light in flight.

Apr 2012	*CGAS-1 / 262*	*Aviator*	*HH-65*	*Maintenance*	*Degraded Operations*

During AFCS off landing, PAC failed to make apporpriate pedal input on touchdown as collective was reduced. Aircraft yawed right 5 degrees and induced a slight rolling motion. MGB Press light illuminated for 1sec, ENG exceedence on CDU. Checked all excedences. MGB Press 9.9 was only exceedence on date.

Apr 2012	*C-2-3 / 263*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Maintenance*	*System Failure*

upon engine runup apu gen failed after jumping a/c found blade wear out of tollerance

Apr 2012	*B-1-3 / 269*	*Aviator*	*AH-64D*	*Maintenance*	*Repeat Discrepancy*

On run-up the aircraft failed the BUCS test due to the number 2 actuator failed. Mission was aborted due to the BUCS test failing three times

Apr 2012	*C-2-3 / 276*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Maintenance*	*Mx Pers/Equip/Parts*

during post mtf hover checks #2 emer engine shutdown due to low oil pressure. on post flight engine oil reservior empty found to be coming

from overboard drain and axis-e area

Apr 2012	*A-4-3 / 289*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Maintenance*	*System Failure*

Aircraft displayed 1600 lbs of fuel after fueling was completed even though both fuel cells were visually full. Continued fuel check through the remainder of flight to ensure fuel burn was accurate. Write up was made and aircraft was placed in red X status

Apr 2012	*C-2-3 / 290*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Maintenance*	*System Failure*

On return flight from Augusta GA No.1 torque reading on co-pilots side indicated erroneous torque numbers. Pilots PDU operated normally with normal TQ indications. Landed at Hunter AAF with no further incident and contacted maintenance for support.

Apr 2012	*B-4-3 / 300*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Maintenance*	*System Failure*

Precautionary Landing due to CHIP ACCESS MDL RH

Apr 2012	*B-1-3 / 303*	*Aviator*	*AH-64D*	*Maintenance*	*System Failure*

During run up crew received an advisary of ENG #1 Oil PSI Low.

Apr 2012	*B-1-3 / 304*	*Aviator*	*AH-64D*	*Maintenance*	*System Failure*

As the crew was returning home approximately 1+40 into the flightan Nose Gearbox 1 Chips advisary appeared. Crew performed the EP and recovered safely to their home station.

Apr 2012	*C-2-3 / 317*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Maintenance*	*System Failure*

aircraft 415 #1 gen caution appeared swapped to aircraft 618 continued flight

Apr 2012	*C-2-3 / 327*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Maintenance*	*System Failure*

Upon starting #1 eng, CE spotted fuel leak on the side of the aircraft. Performed emergency eng shutdown. Flt cancelled due to maintainence.

Apr 2012	*CGAS-1 / 334*	*Aviator*	*HH-65*	*Maintenance*	*Degraded Operations*

RADALT fluctuated while in a 50 feet hover to conduct hoge flyouts. Crew ensured that aircraft was above flyout altitude and completed manuever successfully. Wrote discrepancy up upon return.

2. Communication

Feb 2012	*C-2-3 / 4*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Communication*	*Controlling Agency*

Aircrew coordinated with Marne Radio to conduct training with ground units in the vicinity of KP-29. Due to the proximity of KP-29 to Wright AAF, aircraft was freq changed to Wright Tower. There was confusion on the part of the Wright Tower controller who appeared unaccustomed to controlling aircraft not within the immediate confines of the airfield. This required several radio transmissions to explain our training mission.

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 85*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Communication*	*Air To Air*

National Guard Aircraft used Range Air to Air frequency as flight internal and ops frequency.

Mar 2012	*B-1-3 / 102*	*Aviator*	*AH-64D*	*Communication*	*Air To Ground*

SAP-A Test

Mar 2012	*C-1-3 / 105*	*Aviator*	*AH-64D*	*Communication*	*Controlling Agency*

Clarification on the processes involved between obtaining a clearance from Hunter Ground for clearance through Savannah Class C airspace. It was apparent the information flow between the two is weak at best and led to what Savannah thought was a Class C intrusion on their airspace.

Mar 2012	*C-1-3 / 120*	*Aviator*	*AH-64D*	*Communication*	*Controlling Agency*

Marne Radio's VHF radio is very hard to understand when entering the reservations from KP5.

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 125*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Communication*	*Controlling Agency*

Radio communication with Marne Radio was terrible. Both their UHF and VHF frequencies were distorted and unreadable on the western side of the range vicinity KP1 down to KP25

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 126*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Communication*	*Controlling Agency*

Lost radar contact with Jacksonville Center in vicinity of Allendale (K88J). Been a reoccuring issue. Continued flight as planned VFR.

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 130*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Communication*	*Air To Ground*

We had problems talking with Jax ARTCC and Sav App at all altitudes from 6000 and below north of JYL.

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 145*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Communication*	*Controlling Agency*

Radio Communication with Marne Radio while on the range was unreliable. Most communication, particularly on the West side of the range, was broken and unreadable.

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 146*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Communication*	*Air To Ground*

Could not establish radio communication with Knighthawk Ops. Multiple aircraft were heard trying to contact Knighthawk Ops, and aircraft could talk to each other, but Ops was unresponsive.

Mar 2012	*CGAS-1 / 156*	*Aviator*	*HH-65*	*Communication*	*Crew Coordination Error*

Utilized paper plates for hover reference. Worked well. Unfortunately, dragged swimmer through water. Swimmer reported a slight tweak to a back muscle- swimmer did not feel need to stop training. Swimmer will report to medical in the a.m.

Mar 2012	*C-1-3 / 161*	*Aviator*	*AH-64D*	*Communication*	*Controlling Agency*

While operating in R3005 in contact with MARNE Radio. Their VHF raido is very hard to hear at times.

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 209*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Communication*	*Air To Ground*

Lost comms with Savannah approach about 25 miles west of Savannah. Savannah approach informed me that its dead space between statesboro and macon.

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 211*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Communication*	*Controlling Agency*

Recommend TCAS system for Army aircraft to see other VFR/IFR traffic even while not flight following with ATC.

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 220*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Communication*	*Controlling Agency*

Very windy. Had com trouble with Sav App in vicinity of TBR.

Mar 2012	*B-4-3 / 229*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Communication*	*Air To Air*

While at Taro, 3 Chinooks (B/2-3 GSAB) arrived and would not speak to anyone on the internal frequencies, nor did they adhere to the SOP of only 3 aircraft allowed at one time in Taro.

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 238*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Communication*	*Controlling Agency*

Flight was an aircraft transfer from KHOP to KSVN. Flight was conducted IFR the whole route. Only issue we had was on vector to a PAR rwy 28 at Hunter, we had over 1 minute of no radio coms. Called controller and coms were reestablished. All other aspects were normal. Good flight

Mar 2012	*A-4-3 / 241*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Communication*	*Air To Air*

Fire near kp16. Bell 206 conducting fire operations. Did not make visual contact with aircraft until we were within 5000 meters. Deconflicted by altitude.

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 244*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Communication*	*Equipment Problem*

EDM would not receive aircraft power. EDM died 30 min into flight.

Mar 2012	*C-1-3 / 247*	*Aviator*	*AH-64D*	*Communication*	*Controlling Agency*

Marne radio is still unusable on West side of reservation. Mission had to be put on hold to handle administrative tasks. Multiple times in both cockpits/aircraft the calls had to be repeated internally, or requested from Marne Radio.

Apr 2012	*CGAS-1 / 261*	*Aviator*	*HH-65*	*Communication*	*Crew Coordination Error*

During ramp hoist, FMI conducted a comms failure unbriefed. PAC was in the left seat during the hoist. PNAC in the right seat conducted 3 positive change of controls. Debriefed after the hoist.

Apr 2012	*C-1-3 / 273*	*Aviator*	*AH-64D*	*Communication*	*Controlling Agency*

Marne Radio is still unusable on Western side of reservation.

Apr 2012	*C-2-3 / 277*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Communication*	*Air To Ground*

Flight was IFR local training flight. First leg was normal. Experienced about 2 minutes of lost coms with approach due to low altitue and distance during a missed approach. Had to tune up VHF and UHF, talk on VHF and receive on UHF for clearence. Once we got closer to Hunter we were able to contact and receive on VHF alone. No issues with close calls due to radio issues

Apr 2012	*A-4-3 / 297*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Communication*	*Air To Air*

On 2 APR multiple AH64 were using common air to air frequency as internal coordination between aircraft.

Apr 2012	*C-2-3 / 305*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Communication*	*Tactical Comms*

No comunications possible with ground element supported. Could not establish communications on FM radio in FH or SC modes. Aircraft got good coms checks in all modes prior to departure.

Apr 2012	*C-1-3 / 319*	*Aviator*	*AH-64D*	*Communication*	*Controlling Agency*

While conducting operations on the reservation Marne radio's VHF/UHF radios are coming in staticy and weak

Apr 2012	*A-2-3 / 339*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Communication*	*Controlling Agency*

Runway in use via ATIS was RWY 28 and does not require seperation or any restriction to oppisite traffic. While executing the ILS runway 28, a C-130 was cleared to perform a touch and go on runway 10. The landing lights on C-130 will get your attention.

Apr 2012	*C-2-3 / 341*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Communication*	*Air To Ground*

Flight operations called every member of my crew without leaving a message while we were in flight. We attempted contact, were unable to get them to pick up the phone. We then immediately returned to the airfield in order to assertain what happened thinking that there was an emergency. There was not. Flight operations was merely trying to find out what time we would be returning to the airfield. This made us cut our flight short by 2 hours of training time.

3. WX/Environmental:

Feb 2012	*C-2-3 / 11*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Weather/Environmental*	*Visibility/Ceiling*

PROGRESSION FLIGHT CANCELLED DUE TO WEATHER! CEILINGS AND VISIBILTY BELOW VFR MINIMUMS THE ENTIRE PERIOD.

Feb 2012	*C-2-3 / 13*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Weather/Environmental*	*Visibility/Ceiling*

Weather at KSVN caused us to cancel training mission.

Feb 2012	*B-2-3 / 24*	*Aviator*	*CH-47D*	*Weather/Environmental*	*Forecast Accuracy*

Called and got a local weather brief at 0900L and was given good weather. At approxiametly 0910 duing run-up tuned up ATIS and was weather was 600 broken and less than 3 miles VIS.

Feb 2012	*A-2-3 / 31*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Weather/Environmental*	*Weather Brief*

Weather briefings are sub par. When receiving a weather brief, the briefer asked me simply "if I had any questions about the MEF". Weather briefings should be a discussion between the forecaster and the pilot about the weather. Not simply a validation that I have in fact printed out the mission execution forcast. When asked to go into more detail, the briefer simply read the MEF to me. Briefer initials: AM.

Mar 2012	*CGAS-1 / 42*	*Aviator*	*HH-65*	*Weather/Environmental*	*Forecast Accuracy*

TEST - TEST by CDR Cooper - Operations Officer

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 57*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Weather/Environmental*	*Severe Weather*

Msn not completed due to WX

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 58*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Weather/Environmental*	*Severe Weather*

SEC of the Army choose to drive and canceled aviation support due to WX forcasted T-storms

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 59*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Weather/Environmental*	*Severe Weather*

SEC Army cancelled due to WX

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 70*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Weather/Environmental*	*Visibility/Ceiling*

Controlled burn by KP12 completely blocked white and purple routes.

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 71*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Weather/Environmental*	*Visibility/Ceiling*

Controlled burns in training area D-11 on Ft. Stewart R-3005, affected our missions route of flight, flight time and quality of training. Ft. Stewart has regularly scheduled controlled burns but they are not placed on the Range Notams. They do send out Mame Message email traffic with regards to the burnings but they are sometimes tied into other insignificant information that does not pertain to aviation related duties and can easily be overlooked. If the information were put out on Range Notams which is published days in advance for training/planning purposes this could easily have alleviated .

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 73*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Weather/Environmental*	*Visibility/Ceiling*

A large amount of smoke from controlled burns was present on the FSGA range during flight operations. These controlled burns were not reported in the NOTAMs or reported by weather.

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 139*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Weather/Environmental*	*Severe Weather*

Unable to communicate with KH Ops on multiple radios. Other aircraft had the same issues. Out on R3005 IVO KLHW we had to divert off of purple route because of a storm cell that moved in from the south. Had to take gold route to KP28. Beyond that flight was as planned.

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 157*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Weather/Environmental*	*Weather Brief*

Weather was great!

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 171*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Weather/Environmental*	*Visibility/Ceiling*

Flight went as planned. Cut about 45 minutes short due to weather.

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 177*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Weather/Environmental*	*Forecast Accuracy*

Actual weather conditions were better than the forcast. 10sm CLR observed -forcast was 5sm BR SCT005

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 187*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Weather/Environmental*	*Forecast Accuracy*

HAAF weather did not give a precise weather report. Took off from HAAF enroute to WAAF on Fort Stewart, and weather reported VFR conditions and WAAF was IFR. Mission was completed, would like to have had a more accurate briefing.

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 188*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Weather/Environmental*	*Forecast Accuracy*

WX briefer did not brief low level clouds or that LHW was IFR. The briefer only asked if I had any questions and did not give a detailed brief. We had to find out that the WX was IFR at location in flight. The same briefer gave an update brief later in the day and still did not brief the WX just asked if I had any questions. It is a reoccurring issue and needs to be addressed.

Apr 2012	*C-2-3 / 281*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Weather/Environmental*	*Severe Weather*

Upon arrival at Hunter AAF the current weather warning that was in effect for lightning within 10MN was not transmitted to the aircrew until 40 minutes after it became effective. Weather warning issued for lightning could not have been based on any visual recognition of lightning. The aircrew saw no lightning or thunderstorms or clouds for that matter within approx 25NM of KSVN for the entire time of the warning issued.

Apr 2012	*C-2-3 / 294*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Weather/Environmental*	*Severe Weather*

Flight was delayed 2 hours due to forecasted severe weather. Once the flight departed no issues were encountered during the flight. Executed as planned.

4. Unsafe Practices:

Feb 2012	*A-3-17 / 2*	*Aviator*	*OH-58D*	*Unsafe Practices*	*Controlling Agency*

Ground Control cleared an OH-58D from refuel to parking, as well as a UH-60 from parking to the contact pad. No traffic advisory was given to either aircraft.

Feb 2012	*HHT-3-17 / 9*	*Maintenance*	*OH-58D*	*Unsafe Practices*	*Personnel*

Corrected Soldier driving M-Gator without eye protection.

Mar 2012	*AFS / 43*	*Management*		*Unsafe Practices*	*Aircraft*

This morning (29 Feb 12) 12 OH58D helicopters arrived at Truscott Air Terminal to stage for movement to NTC. None of the Airfield staff had any knowledge of the planned movement. This resulted in DOL personnel directing the aircraft to hover past the red no hover lines and proceeded to hover within 20 feet of various ground support equipment, stair trucks, semi-trucks , and personnel operating in the area.

Mar 2012	*B-1-3 / 90*	*Aviator*	*AH-64D*	*Unsafe Practices*	*Ground Equipment*

At 1045L at HAAF while an AH-64 was being towed from the Hanger on the West Ramp I observed a small Yellow re-fuel truck operated by a DOD civilian driving his truck at 30 MPH on the Ramp. When he returned from the North West ramp I got his attention and asked him to slow down. He contiuned on his route to POL Island at the same rate of speed without slowing down.

Mar 2012	*C-1-3 / 92*	*Aviator*	*AH-64D*	*Unsafe Practices*	*Personnel*

this is just a test. is anyone reading this?

Mar 2012	*B-1-3 / 95*	*Aviator*	*AH-64D*	*Unsafe Practices*	*Ground Equipment*

Test for CW4 Carmen

Mar 2012	*D-4-3 / 99*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Unsafe Practices*	*FOD*

Safety wire was found (FOD) in the hangar, bay #4. Relayed the information to PC.

Mar 2012	*B-2-3 / 103*	*Aviator*	*CH-47D*	*Unsafe Practices*	*Personnel*

None

Mar 2012	*C-2-3 / 131*	*Aviator*	*UH-60A*	*Unsafe Practices*	*Ground Equipment*

Entire flight went according to plan. Upon return to Hunter, our aircraft went to hot refuel. The fueler bonded/grounded the aircraft but failed to bond/ground the refueling hose. Once refueling was complete, we spoke with the refuelers and reminded them to use the hose ground wire prior to refueling.

Mar 2012	*C-1-3 / 151*	*Aviator*	*AH-64D*	*Unsafe Practices*	*Personnel*

At refuel, personnel were not familiar with refueling procedures. After anti-collisions lights were off FARP personnel visually signaled to approach aircraft. The FARP personnel incorrectly refueled the aircraft resulting in approximately 300 pounds less than capacity. It was discovered later after shutdown in parking that somehow during refuel the fuel cap had been broken from the lanyard and left on the ground at the FARP.

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 178*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Unsafe Practices*	*Controlling Agency*

a few instances when tower confused our aircraft with anothers tail number, believing we were cleared for something other than what we were completing when in fact we were following towers directions and it was his mistakes. It made for confusion on the radios and with a less compitent crew it could have been an issue. The controller did verbally realize his mistakes and announced such over the radio

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 189*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Unsafe Practices*	*Ground Equipment*

Mechanics / crewchiefs were towing an aircraft direct from the maintenance pads, through parking, to their assigned parking space with total disregard to taxi lines. These Soldiers attempted to speed up their progress when they noticed that aircraft were attempting to ground taxi into the pads they were attempting to tow their aircraft through.

Mar 2012	*A-2-3 / 201*	*Aviator*	*UH-60L*	*Unsafe Practices*	*Aircraft*

Civilian ACFT not flight following or talking on an atc freq. flew infront of our flight path. continue to flight follow when flying VFR cross country

Cross Service Comparison: The final chart of this review is a comparison of categorical data gathered from Army, Coast Guard, and Naval aviators. Although the number of reports for Army and Coast Guard units do not compare to the Navy, there is a clear indication that the aviators from all three services share common challenges in the conduct of daily flight operations.



End of SAP-A Mid-Phase Operational Test Review