

ARMY GROUND RISK-MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

Countermeasure

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


**Between Hell
and a
Hot Place**

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Features



on the web
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


Paragraph 6 Won't Cut It Anymore!

The steady reduction in Army accidental fatalities between 1975 and 2000 is one of the Army's true success stories. During these years, we came to recognize that protecting Soldiers' lives was vital to preserving our combat readiness. As an Army, we developed a series of programs designed to aggressively attack the three main accident categories: materiel failure, environmental conditions, and human error. During those 25 years, safety modifications to our equipment have made materiel failures extremely rare. In addition, aggressive research programs and control measures have radically decreased the number of accidents caused by environmental conditions. The most significant factor was the emphasis on safety by senior leadership. That emphasis resulted in a decrease in the number of Army accidents caused by human error.

Since Fiscal Year 2000, the Army has experienced a troubling increase in accidental fatalities. The number of environmental and materiel causes remains low, and senior leadership emphasis continues to be strong. In fact, senior leaders are energizing the system to promote risk management. The major commands are actively involved, and their safety programs have some great initiatives. So where are we falling short? Clearly, the Global War on Terrorism has increased our Soldiers' exposure to risk as they conduct 7-day-a-week operations throughout 120 countries. But there is more to the story ...

30-Year Historic Trend



A careful study of the root causes of Army accidents over the last 12 months has identified a glaring trend: the failure of junior leaders to properly manage risk. Company-level planning and troop-leading procedures routinely fail to mitigate our most basic hazards. On the ground, junior leaders are not following troop-leading procedures and, therefore, recons, pre-convoy inspections, and rollover drills and rehearsals are not mitigating risks. In the last three weeks, three HMMWVs, an LMTV, and an M2 Bradley have experienced rollover accidents that resulted in six fatalities. Whether it is a platoon leader who fails to properly reconnoiter and supervise mission planning or a squad leader who fails to demand his soldiers wear seatbelts and not speed, most accidents can be prevented by basic actions at the junior leader level.

So, is our junior leadership to blame? If so, then how come they have performed so admirably in every other facet of the Global War on Terrorism? Why would their ability to conduct risk management be any different? The truth is, as an Army we have failed to teach and coach our

junior leaders on how to properly mitigate risk. We give our future leaders one or two hours of classroom instruction and, three months later, expect them to conduct risk management as a convoy commander in Baghdad. More often than not, the cadre at our schools complete the field training risk management plan without including their students in the process. How can we expect junior leaders to understand and use risk management if we don't give them the chance to practice it during their troop leader procedure training? Simply put, we can't.

How are we doing in the field? We are not teaching our junior leaders the right lessons. We teach them that risk management is, literally and figuratively, paragraph 6 of their operations order—an afterthought. By this, they infer safety is a restriction to their training or mission. However, when safety is embedded early in the mission-planning process, the unit can implement better control measures and conduct more challenging training.

Safety is not about being risk averse. It is about mitigating risk so everyone makes it home from a hard mission to fight another day. Our most powerful control measures are standards and discipline. The Special Operations Forces regularly conduct complex missions around the world, but do so with one basic premise: do the basic things right. Just by doing the basics to standard, any unit can make the tough jobs look simple. This is the attitude we need to instill in our Soldiers, especially our junior leaders.

The Safety Center is actively working with Training and

8 Troop Leader Procedures

1. Receive the Mission
2. Issue the Warning Order
3. Make Tentative Plan
4. Start Necessary Movement
5. Reconnoiter
6. Complete the Plan
7. Issue the Complete Order
8. Supervise



Operations Order

1. Situation
2. Mission
3. Execution
4. Service Support
5. Command & Signal
6. Oh yeah, what about safety?!

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to improve the quality of risk management training by taking it out of the classroom and embedding it into troop-leading and field training. Furthermore, we are developing videos and interactive tools to improve our leaders' understanding of how to use our ASMIS-1, RMIS, and ARAS tools to conduct better risk management. In the interim, we need every Soldier, regardless of rank, to stop treating risk management as an afterthought. As GEN Schoomaker has repeatedly stated, "We cannot afford to be risk averse, but we must be smart about managing our risks."

In 1992, the introduction of the five-step risk-management process resulted in an immediate reduction in Army accidents. Former Army Chief of Staff GEN Dennis Reimer's emphasis on reducing off-duty accidents in 1997 had a similar positive impact. These initiatives were successful because they inspired an immediate culture change. To curb the current accident trends and make the Army Safety Campaign a success, we also must inspire a culture change in the way we view risk management. 🍎

**Our Army is at War.
Be Safe and Make it Home!**


BG Joe Smith

Shortcut to Online Safety

Tired of memorizing userids and passwords? You can now use the same password you use for your Army Knowledge Online account to access our online Risk Management Information System (RMIS) and Accident Reporting Automation System (ARAS) safety tools.

You say you can't get an AKO account, but still want to access RMIS? Just register through our new system at <https://safety.army.mil> and click on the ARAS banner or the "Sign-in" or "RMIS" buttons at the top of the page.

Need RMIS information immediately? Contact our Help Desk at (334) 255-1390, DSN 558-1390, or e-mail helpdesk@safetycenter.army.mil

<https://safety.army.mil>



BETWEEN HELL

The Bradley Fighting Vehicle's engine stalled and the vehicle rolled to a stop after rounding a bend in the trail. The driver checked his gauges, but couldn't figure out why the engine had quit. No matter. It was the end of a hard rotation at the National Training Center (NTC). The Bradley had live ammunition on board and it was a hasty live-fire attack. The crew would make do and continue the mission.

The driver restarted the engine, shifted the transmission into gear and stomped on the accelerator. The Bradley had barely gone 10 feet when the crew heard a loud clattering, followed by a sudden bang and popping noise. Fuel had gotten into the oil, reducing its ability to lubricate the engine. As a result, the engine seized and threw a rod. Part of the rod tore through the bottom of the oil pan, taking a piece of the block with it. At the same time, friction ignited the residue of fuel and other fluids in the engine compartment and started a fire.

This entire sequence happened quickly and was so violent it blew the engine compartment panel off

its brackets and into the driver. The driver was stunned and rapidly exited his driver's hatch after seeing flames in the engine compartment. In his haste to exit the vehicle, all he did was yell "fire!" to the rest of the Bradley crew and the dismounts riding in the compartment.

Upon hearing the driver yell "fire," the crew and dismounts began to react. The Bradley commander (BC) reported his situation over the radio. The dismount squad leader was unsuccessfully trying to open the rear troop door. Smoke from the fire began flowing into the crew compartment, and the dismounts yelled for the driver to lower the ramp so they could get out.

The driver heard their cries and climbed back into his compartment. He initiated his part of the vehicle fire crew drill, opening the ramp so the dismounts could escape.



The observer controller (OC) saw all of this from a distance. The Bradley had missed a turn while navigating, and the OC thought it was attempting to get back on course. Even when the ramp was lowered and the dismounts poured out, the OC thought it was a security halt. Not until he saw smoke rolling from the rear of the vehicle did he understand the situation. He immediately informed his higher, and then dismounted his track to direct the crew to use their portable fire extinguishers to fight the fire.

Within 15 minutes the fire spread into the turret area and crew compartment. This made the situation even more dangerous because of the live 25 mm ammunition and TOW missiles on board. The Soldiers moved safely away from the vehicle and, after about 30 minutes, the ammunition began cooking off. The Bradley was destroyed but, fortunately, no Soldiers were injured.

During the investigation, several key factors that led to the accident became apparent. Had these factors been recognized and handled appropriately, this accident might have been prevented or, at least, the damage lessened.

With the rapid pace of deployments and training cycles affecting the Army during

AND A HOT PLACE!

the Global War on Terrorism, several units (such as the one in this story) have opted to

leave equipment behind in administrative, or low-usage, storage. With few personnel remaining behind to monitor this equipment, the Army has contracted civilian mechanics to perform 10/20-level maintenance checks and repairs. If managed properly, this process should effectively maintain the equipment in 10/20 status, as required. However, without aggressive military quality assurance, the result can be non-mission capable equipment awaiting the unit's return for proper services and corrective maintenance.

Checking the Bradley's maintenance history, the investigating board could not find a record of a complete or properly conducted service (annual or semiannual) during the preceding two years. What documentation was provided showed a technical inspection (TI) consisting of checking the oil and operator-level maintenance checks. Witness interviews confirmed these findings.

Prior to going to NTC, the unit had maintained an aggressive training schedule. The training included several gunnery and range exercises, and culminated in training events from squad level to brigade level. Since returning from its last combat rotation in July 2003, the unit had experienced an approximately 75 percent turnover in personnel. Experience—defined

SFC RAYMOND HAMILTON
Ground Accident Investigator
U.S. Army Safety Center

Photos: MR. TERRY SMART
PM Combat Systems Safety

as how long the Soldiers had worked together and the length of time Soldiers had served in key leadership positions—was relatively low. A lot of young sergeants had stepped up to the plate to fill positions of higher responsibility, and new officers had rotated into platoon leadership slots.

Maintenance was identified as an issue early on, and time was allotted for unit maintenance personnel to conduct services. The work load was divided between civilian contractors and military mechanics during the equipment hand over. The unit had opted to perform all Bradley services themselves. However, a change of mission for the unit drastically shortened the planned time for maintenance.

Several Bradleys in this unit, including the one that had the accident, had their engines replaced about a month before going to the railhead for NTC. In this Bradley's case, no engine oil sample was taken, so the engine wasn't registered in the system for maintenance tracking purposes. After arriving at NTC, unit maintenance personnel had the opportunity to have a sample taken and tested, but chose not to do so. As a result, they missed a vital step in the Army maintenance process. Additional maintenance was performed on the Bradley while it was in the rotational unit bivouac area before rolling into the box.

The board reviewed the unit's tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) and maintenance

“The command had properly identified the hazard but failed to properly assess it and provide proper control measures to reduce the risk.”

standing operating procedures and determined the unit’s own guidance, if followed, would be effective for operations.

Note: Observer/controllers at NTC teach, coach, and mentor using each unit’s TACSOP, and provide feedback to the unit through an after action review (AAR). Also, there is an exercise operation procedures manual (EXOP) at NTC that contains minimal operating procedures for all units deploying there. However, the EXOP should never be used to replace Army guidance or unit TACSOPs.

The battalion commander performed a risk assessment for the NTC training rotation and identified vehicle fire as a hazard. When investigators reviewed the unit’s risk mitigation guidance, there was no reference to crews rehearsing vehicle fire drills, as described in applicable technical manuals (TMs) or field manuals (FMs). The Soldiers and leaders on the destroyed Bradley didn’t understand the vehicle’s fire suppression system. The command had properly identified the hazard, but failed to properly assess it and provide proper control measures to reduce the risk.

The battalion risk assessment was provided to subordinate commanders for review and implementation. During interviews it was obvious

that Soldiers were not being taught the risk management process. It was also clear that key platoon leadership didn’t grasp the five-step risk management process or how it could help them accomplish their mission with minimal personnel or equipment losses.

National Training Center guidance requires platoon and company leaders to inform OCs that crews have performed fire evacuation and other safety drills before rolling into the box. However, the OCs aren’t required to confirm that.

Depending on mission requirements, the accident Bradley’s crew and dismounts had changed during the rotation. However, rollover and vehicle fire evacuation drills were never properly rehearsed. Even when this Bradley went into a 15-foot-deep wadi on a night mission (a near-miss earlier during the rotation that resulted in minimal equipment damage and no personnel injuries), it was stated that rollover drills hadn’t been performed. In addition, several of the dismounted infantrymen said they didn’t know the Bradley had seatbelts. When the Bradley was recovered from the wadi, it had lost a lot of engine oil. The company maintenance personnel instructed the driver to top off the fluid levels and continue with the mission. The only inspection performed on the Bradley was the driver’s TI.



The exterior handle for the squad compartment FM 200 Halon system is located on the right rear of the vehicle.



The lever for the squad compartment fire suppression system is on the lower-left part of the driver’s control panel.

Identified the hazard, and provide proper risk.”

Prior to the wadi incident, another track driver had been using this Bradley. While performing preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), the driver identified a potential fuel leak, and also noticed fuel in the engine oil. In addition, dismounted infantry, along with the BC and crew, said they'd noticed a strong fuel smell in the crew compartment during the rotation.

Company maintenance personnel were informed of these problems. They couldn't find the fuel leak, but they did find fuel in the oil. Because of mission requirements and the limited number of mission-capable Bradleys in the platoon, a decision was made to continue using this Bradley. The crew attempted to take it to a unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) for troubleshooting, but the UMCP had jumped to another location on the battlefield, so the Bradley returned to the unit's assembly area (AA).

With that brief history in place, let's observe what happened during the 10 to 15 minutes after the driver yelled "fire."

- The driver failed to activate the engine fire suppression system by pulling the exterior manual handle or turning the interior knob.
- The BC failed to activate the squad compartment fire suppression system by pulling the interior or exterior manual pull handles. In addition, he failed to ensure the crew performed a vehicle crew fire drill before the accident happened.
- The dismounts failed to properly follow crew drill procedures and evacuated the Bradley without taking the two portable fire extinguishers mounted in the squad compartment. They also failed to activate the squad compartment fire suppression system by pulling the interior fire suppression handle.
- No effort was made by the dismounts or the Bradley crew to extinguish or fight the vehicle fire until the OC directed them to get the portable extinguishers. Even then, no one initiated the vehicle's manual fire suppression system.

The Bradley's occupants focused on removing sensitive items instead of containing and extinguishing the fire and, as a result, the Bradley was lost. This is another example of a mechanical failure caused by human error. It demonstrates the cumulative nature



The interior handle to activate the squad compartment suppression system is located to the left of the ramp.




The handle for the engine compartment's FM 200 Halon system is located on the left front of the vehicle.

of this accident—along with early warning signs—and the resulting domino effect. Although the hazard was identified as "Vehicle fire," the following main risk-mitigating factors were missed:

- Proper vehicle maintenance in accordance with applicable technical manuals.
- Crew and occupants trained on vehicle fire suppression system.
- Rehearsal of vehicle fire crew drills with dismounts and crew.
- Perform rehearsals as required when vehicle occupants or crew are changed.

The lesson learned was expensive—but it could have been worse. A Soldier could have been severely burned or killed. Do YOU know what to do if you have a vehicle fire? (See the following story, "Where's the Fire?") 

Contact the author at (334) 255-2933, DSN 558-2933, or e-mail raymond.hamilton@safetycenter.army.mil



How ready is your crew for a fire on your Bradley Fighting Vehicle? What actions must the driver take? What about the Bradley commander (BC)? What about the guys in the back? You say, “C’mon that’s all common sense stuff—we did all of that fire evacuation training years ago.” Unfortunately, common sense is not so common, and if we fail to rehearse these basic drills we are leaving the safety of our lives and equipment to chance. So let’s take a few minutes and review some of the basics.


First, let’s discuss how the Bradley’s fire suppression system works. The Bradley has two separate fire suppression systems, one for the squad compartment,

and a separate system for the engine compartment. Each system has separate fire bottles. The ones for the squad compartment are next to the turret, while the fire bottle for the engine compartment is underneath the instrument panel. It’s important to remember that the two systems are totally independent. If one system activates, it will not automatically activate the other system.

The squad system (the one in the back) will work in the automatic mode or manually, depending on how the switch is set. In the automatic mode, once the sensors in the vehicle detect a fire, the system activates and discharges Halon fire suppression agent from the two

rear fire bottles into the squad compartment. You can manually activate the system by pulling either the fire extinguisher handle located in the right rear of the squad compartment by the ramp, or the exterior handle at the right rear of the Bradley. Don’t panic! The horror stories about Halon sucking the oxygen from your lungs are just not true. You have plenty of time to get out. A good load plan and rehearsals of Crew Drill 3 in Field Manual (FM) 3-21.71 (7-7J) are an important part of the evacuation process. (Note: this crew drill can be used or modified for any of the turreted Bradley variants.)

Once again, the engine fire suppression system is separate from the squad system and must



MSG MIKE BARKSDALE

A Co, 2-58 Inf Regt
Fort Benning, GA

be manually activated. After shutting down the engine, the driver needs to reach under the instrument panel and turn the knob to the left. As an alternative, the driver can pull the exterior handle by the driver's hatch to activate the engine system. Keep in mind that the exterior fire extinguisher handles only operate ONE system. The handle at the right rear is for the

crew compartment, the one at the left front is for the engine compartment.

When was the last time you checked the fire suppression system? How about that fire bottle under the instrument panel? We all know it's a pain to check. However, without good preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) how do you know it will work if you need it? Make sure to check the cables that run from the handles on the outside to the valves on the bottles. These cables deteriorate, lose support, and develop kinks over time. If the cables look bad, write them up and have the mechanics check them.

OK, so now we know what to do if we have a fire. However, how can we keep a fire from starting in the first place?

First, Ground Precautionary Message (GPM) 02-001 addresses a problem with cracked fuel fittings on the engine. This GPM directs your mechanics to replace the brass fittings with steel fittings the next time they pull the pack. Do yourself a favor and make sure the mechanics have replaced the fuel fittings on your Bradley.

Second, there is a problem with the power cable for the driver's night viewer getting pinched in the driver's hatch. If that happens, the cable can short out and cause a fire in the vehicle. There is a new cable and routing to fix this problem.

Check out issue number 31 of *Bradley Bits* for information on routing the 1W300 cable to avoid this problem. *Bradley Bits* is on the Program Manager Bradley Web site at <http://www.pmbradley.org>.

Finally, do your best to keep the hull clean. If possible, pull the pack in a place where you can wash out the hull (I know, easier said than done—but a rag will help!) If you have a large amount of petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) in the bottom of the hull, it can quickly become a fire hazard.

Don't let your Bradley become another fire statistic in the U.S. Army Safety Center database. Follow your "-10" PMCS and take a minute to educate yourself on

"Follow your "-10" PMCS and take a minute to educate yourself on the fire suppression system."

the fire suppression system. If you are trained and know what to do, you won't have to be afraid. You can save your life and others and preserve a critical piece of equipment. 

This article was adapted from the October 2001 issue of *Countermeasure*. Contact the author at (706) 544-9252, or e-mail michael.barksdale@us.army.mil

Blazing Booties!

MSG MICHAEL BARKSDALE
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Wanna “take it in the shorts” really bad? Mixing NOMEX and the Combat Vehicle Crewman (CVC) uniform with issue-type polypropylene (poly-pro) underwear can give a whole new meaning to the words “rump roast.” While NOMEX will withstand temperatures up to 700 degrees, poly-pro melts at less than half that heat. During a fire, NOMEX can transfer enough heat to your poly-pro underwear to melt it to your skin! Doesn’t sound to me like a very comfortable way to survive a vehicle fire.

OK, if you can’t wear poly-pro what can you do? During winter, a combat vehicle is just like a refrigerator! Your only choice is to wear aramid or 100 percent cotton underwear. Below is a table of national stock numbers (NSNs) for both types. Tell your supply folks to use an advice code of 2b. This code will ensure that you don’t get a substitute made of synthetic materials.

A second issue exists concerning the gloves available at clothing sales and other stores. While these gloves are black and look just like NOMEX CVC gloves, they’ve been tested and are not fire resistant. Because of that, they aren’t suitable replacements for the NOMEX CVC glove. The list below provides the NSNs for the proper gloves.

Lastly, keep your CVC uniform clean. Oil, grease, or household starch will cause the fabric to burn. Cleaning the CVC uniform to remove these contaminants will restore its fire retardant properties.

Don’t survive a vehicle fire only to find yourself with poly-pro melted to your skin or third-degree burns to your hands. Worn properly, the CVC uniform and gloves will help protect you from burns should a fire happen in your combat vehicle. 

Adapted from the October 2001 issue of *Countermeasure*. Contact the author at (706) 544-9252, or e-mail michael.barksdale@us.army.mil

National Stock Numbers

Drawers, 100% cotton, cold weather

8415-01-051-1175 X-Small
8415-00-782-3226 Small
8415-00-782-3227 Medium
8415-00-782-3228 Large
8415-00-782-3229 X-Large

Drawers, Flyers, Aramid

8415-00-467-4075 SMALL
8415-00-467-4076 MEDIUM
8415-00-467-4078 LARGE
8415-00-467-4100 X-LARGE
8415-01-043-4036 X-SMALL

Undershirt, 100% cotton, cold weather

8415-01-051-1174 X-Small
8415-00-270-2012 Small
8415-00-270-2013 Medium
8415-00-270-2014 Large
8415-00-270-2015 X-Large

Gloves, Combat Vehicle Crewman

8415-01-074-9428 SIZE 5
8415-01-074-9429 SIZE 6
8415-01-074-9430 SIZE 7
8415-01-074-9431 SIZE 8
8415-01-074-9432 SIZE 9
8415-01-074-9433 SIZE 10
8415-01-074-9434 SIZE 11

Undershirt, Flyers, Man, Aramid

8415-00-485-6547 SMALL
8415-00-485-6548 MEDIUM
8415-00-485-6680 LARGE
8415-00-485-6681 X-LARGE
8415-01-043-8375 X-SMALL

Letters to the Editor:

Keeping Returning Soldiers Safe

I am writing as the mother of a Soldier who recently returned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). While my son was serving in Iraq, I faithfully corresponded and sent morale-booster packages to him, his squad, his platoon sergeant, and other Soldiers in his platoon. Birthdays, Valentine's Day, Easter, Fourth of July, Halloween, Thanksgiving, and Christmas were some of the events they missed with their families, so we parents laced our letters, cards, and e-mails to them with love, hope, and prayers. We diligently prayed they would come safely home.

Now by the grace of God they are home. For the most part, they're between 21 and 26 years old. They're all young and they've all saved up their hazard pay. They're anxious to get out, be free, make up for lost time, and spend that hazard pay.

Summer's on the way. Although they've not been home for long, six Soldiers (my son included) from one platoon have bought new motorcycles and I'm sure there are more within the company. One of these Soldiers already has had an accident and is in intensive care as I write this. We don't know if the accident was caused by human error, mechanical problems, lack of training, or lack of experience. I do know that I called my son and asked him to promise not to ride his newly purchased motorcycle again. He gave me that, "Yeah, mom."

Soldiers had to gain experience beyond their years to survive the dangers they faced during OIF. But that doesn't mean they'll come home knowing how to safely ride a motorcycle.

I believe safety can work—but only if people work together. We, as Soldiers' families and friends, must work together to protect them after they've come home. Why bring them back safely from Iraq only to see them die on their home soil on a motorcycle? 🚗

An Army mom and proud of it!

Editor's Note: The mother who sent this letter has recently joined Operation Guardian Angel. The U.S. Army Safety Center supports this V Corps/CJTF-7 program. It is designed to get concerned families, friends, and patriotic Americans involved in helping Soldiers stay safe after they return from OIF. With more than 6,000 new motorcycles on order through AAFES for returning Soldiers, this is an area that desperately needs dedicated Guardian Angels. If you're interested, visit the Guardian Angel Web site at <http://safety.army.mil/index-guardianangel.html>. Why not sign up and help the Army win the War on Accidents?

You're sitting in your tent over in the "sandbox." It may not be much of a home compared to what you left behind, but at least you figure you're relatively safe. You're reading a paperback book when you suddenly hear a "blamm!" Startled, you drop the book only to see one of your battle buddies slump to the floor. A few feet away, another Soldier looks at his weapon. Shocked and horrified, he can't believe what he's just done.

Think this is unlikely? In separate incidents barely a year apart, two Soldiers were injured in accidental shootings at the same forward operating base. During January 2003, one Soldier accidentally shot another in the chest with an

First, there were no NCOs present during either of these accidents to supervise these Soldiers. In one accident, there were no NCOs living in the tent with their Soldiers. During the other accident, all the NCOs were in the motor pool.

Second, there was a past history of problems. In one accident, Soldiers had previously mishandled their weapons, but had not been corrected by their NCOs. In the other accident, NCOs had allowed more than six months to pass since they had supervised their Soldiers doing weapons clearing and functions checks.

Finally, both accidents happened in sleeping areas, places where televisions, radios, and video games can distract Soldiers from the task they're performing. For this reason, some units have

A TENT CAN BE A DANGEROUS

M9 pistol. Barely a year later, a second Soldier accidentally fired his M4 and hit another Soldier in the head. Both shootings happened in GP Medium tents, which served as the Soldiers' sleeping quarters. One Soldier completely recovered. Sadly, the other Soldier will spend the rest of his life disabled.

The differences between these two accidents are less important than the similarities. Let's take a look at those.

- Both accidents involved (only) enlisted Soldiers E-4 and below.
- Both accidents occurred in the Soldiers' sleeping quarters.
- Both accidents were caused by a Soldier mishandling his weapon.
- Both Soldiers were surprised when their weapons discharged.
- Both Soldiers were shocked to have shot another Soldier they considered a best friend.
- Both shooters were considered by their leadership to be among the best Soldiers in their respective organizations.

How can one Soldier shoot another, even accidentally? For the answer, both accidents must be analyzed further than just the pulling of the trigger.

SFC BENNIE CAGLE
Ground Accident Investigator
U.S. Army Safety Center



policies preventing Soldiers from performing weapons maintenance in sleeping areas.

How do we prevent such accidents from happening again? The answer is that NCOs must train their Soldiers in proper weapons handling and periodically check and retrain them as needed. Weapons clearing and handling is NCO business. If NCOs are not involved in training and supervising, these accidents will continue. An NCO for one of the injured Soldiers said that if a Soldier needed supervision, then he didn't need that Soldier. The truth of the matter is if an NCO doesn't want to supervise his Soldiers, then the Army doesn't need that NCO!

As NCOs, you must train and supervise your Soldiers

during operations. That's the only way you're going to bring them home safely! 🚫

Contact the author at (334) 255-2381, DSN 558-2381, or e-mail bennie.cagle@safetycenter.army.mil



BATTLEGROUND

"WEAPONS CLEARING AND HANDLING IS NCO BUSINESS."



Doin' the 'D

BOB VAN ELSBERG

Managing Editor

I was driving west on I-40 toward Oklahoma City, anxiously looking forward to meeting an old friend I hadn't seen in years. It was a chilly November morning and the last thing I wanted to do was get outside my nice, warm car. However, as I headed down the road, I spotted a woman who'd pulled onto the right shoulder and was attempting to change her right-rear tire. I could see she was alone and having a hard time. I could hear my dad's words in the back of my head: "A man always helps a woman in trouble."

I glanced at my watch. This was going to delay my arrival in Oklahoma City, but I couldn't just drive by and leave the lady out there in the cold struggling with her tire. So I pulled to the right-hand shoulder and then backed up to where she was stopped. She was relieved to see someone had stopped to help her.

I jacked up the car and blocked one of the wheels so the car wouldn't roll. I went to her trunk and saw a temporary "donut" spare tire. I hated them—I'd rather lose a little trunk space than run around on an undersized tire that doesn't match the rest. Still, what could I do?

I removed the flat tire and mounted the spare, then let the car down and put the jack and flat tire

in the trunk. The woman thanked me profusely. I encouraged her to drive slowly and carefully because donut spares are not designed to perform like a full-sized tire. As I pulled away, I watched her in my rearview mirror. She was putting some items back into her trunk and would soon be on her way. Even though the stop had delayed me, I felt good about having taken the time to help her.

I hadn't been back on the road for more than a few minutes when a car rapidly overtook me, swept into the left lane, and passed me like I was parked at the curb. I glanced at my speedometer—I was doing the speed limit. Then I recognized the car. It was the woman I'd helped a few minutes earlier! She was tearing down the interstate and weaving through traffic like she was at a road race. I began to wonder if I did her a favor by changing the flat.

I watched her disappear into the distance. I still had an hour to go before I reached Oklahoma City. I figured I might see her again—this time as a crumpled mass of metal on the side of the road. That didn't happen to her, but it has happened to others. Last year an Army National Guardsman was on her way home from duty and driving on a temporary (T-type) spare. Witnesses said she

Here are some tips for drivers using temporary spare tires:

- DO NOT exceed the maximum vehicle load rating noted on the tire placard.
- DO NOT exceed the manufacturer's recommended speed limitations for driving with a temporary spare. That speed should be listed in your owner's manual.
- DO NOT tow trailers when using a temporary spare.
- DO NOT attempt to repair or remove the temporary spare from its wheel.
- DO NOT drive through an automatic car wash with a temporary spare. The


temporary spare is smaller than a conventional tire and thus reduces the vehicle's ground clearance. As a result, the vehicle could get stuck and be damaged. In addition, Nissan North America, Inc. suggests the following when using temporary (T-type) spare tires:

- Drive carefully while the T-type spare tire is installed. Avoid sharp turns and abrupt braking while driving.
- Do not use more than one T-type spare tire at the same time.

- When driving on roads covered with snow or ice, the T-type spare tire should not be used on the drive wheels.
 - For front-wheel drive vehicles: Use the original (full size) tires on the front, and the T-type spare on the rear.
 - For rear-wheel drive vehicles: Use the original (full size) tires on the rear and the T-type spare on the front.
- Important: Do not use tire chains on T-type spares. Use chains only on the original (full size) tires.

was going faster than 70 mph when she lost control of her car, which went off the road and overturned. Even though she was wearing her seatbelt, she was killed in the crash. The owner's manual for her car cautioned drivers not to exceed 50 mph when using a temporary spare tire.

Her experience was a tragedy, but you don't have



to make the same mistake. If you have to drive on your temporary spare, check your owner's manual for information on speed limitations and handling concerns. Those can vary from vehicle to vehicle, so just because you've read one owner's manual don't assume you know everything. Also, check the inflation pressure on the temporary spare from time to time BEFORE you need it. Just like normal tires, they can lose air pressure over time. There's nothing quite as frustrating as having two flats—one on the ground and the other in the trunk! In addition, temporary spares are not intended for long-term driving. It's important to get the damaged tire repaired or replaced as soon as possible. 🚗

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POV

UPDATE

FY 04
through
March 2004

Class A-C accidents/soldiers killed

<input type="checkbox"/>	Cars	62/34
<input type="checkbox"/>	Vans	0/0
<input type="checkbox"/>	Trucks	21/8
<input type="checkbox"/>	Motorcycles	19/5
<input type="checkbox"/>	Other*	4/1

*Includes tractor-trailers, unknown POVs, and bicycles

Total POV Fatalities

48

FY03	45	3-Yr Avg	45
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I was with a group of riders out for a Sunday ride with my girlfriend, who was riding on the back of my Honda Gold Wing. It was early afternoon, and she and I decided to head back to San Antonio. Once we got back onto Interstate 10, I set the cruise control at 70 mph and put a compact disc in the player. Just south of

which was a HUGE mistake! If she'd had a neck or spinal cord injury, that could have made things much worse. Luckily, that wasn't the case, and once I saw she was all right, I passed out. The ambulance took us to the hospital and,

When 18 Wheels Trumps Two

MR. RYAN BROWN
Pensacola, FL

Kerrville we went into a right curve that headed up an incline.

As we were going up the incline, an 18-wheeler in the lane on our right decided to pass a motor home. It may be that the diesel driver couldn't see us because of the angle of his cab and the position of his trailer. Whatever the reason, he suddenly whipped into our lane.

Rather than tangling with an 80,000-pound truck, I opted to go into the median, where I felt we had a better chance of surviving. As I went into the median, the Honda's tires hopped and skipped over fist-sized rocks. There was no way I could keep control, so I turned the forks to the left so we would be thrown ahead of the bike when it went down. I knew we would slide further than the bike, and I didn't want to slide into it as it tumbled.

I can only imagine how much WE tumbled as we went down at 70 mph. All I remember between the crash and the ambulance arriving is that I woke up and ran to my girlfriend to see if she was OK. Someone had removed her helmet,

when I awoke, we were both in the emergency room.

Without my helmet, I know I would have been killed. As it was, I broke my clavicle and cracked a shoulder blade and three ribs. Were it not for my jacket, gloves and long pants, the rocks would have torn into my skin. The bike, on the other hand, was a mess! The brake cable was the only thing still holding the front forks and wheel together!

I can't stress enough how proper safety training helps prevent accidents, and how protective gear helps you survive those accidents that do happen. The Motorcycle Safety Foundation basic and advanced courses I took didn't just teach me how to ride, they taught me why a motorcycle behaves the way it does. Because of that, I knew what to do in an accident and am still here to share this story. 🍀

Ride smart—ride safe!

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Class A

■ Soldier suffered a permanent total disability when the M931 he was driving overturned. The truck was pulling a water trailer that fishtailed, causing the accident. The Soldier, who was wearing his Kevlar helmet and seatbelt, suffered injuries to his head.

■ One Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) was killed and three Soldiers were hospitalized after their vehicles collided head-on. The three Soldiers were in a HMMWV and acting as the lead vehicle in a convoy at the time of the accident. The DAC was driving a Government-leased sport utility vehicle.

■ Soldier was killed when the non-tactical Government truck he was riding in overturned. A U.S. Air Force member was driving the truck and reportedly was not injured.

■ Soldier died after being struck and pinned by a HEMTT during a roadside convoy maintenance operation. The Soldier was standing on the curb as the HEMTT was backing up and attempting to link with a disabled vehicle. The Soldier was pinned by the HEMTT's right-rear wheels.

■ Soldier was killed when the HMMWV he was driving struck another HMMWV head-on and overturned into a water-filled ditch. The Soldier was pinned in the overturned HMMWV and drowned.

■ Soldier suffered fatal injuries when the HMMWV she was riding in overturned. The driver lost

control of the HMMWV while speeding, causing the vehicle to roll over and pin the deceased Soldier beneath it.

■ Soldier was killed when the M925 he was riding in overturned. The truck was hauling an M198 Towed Howitzer when the driver reportedly lost control. Injuries to the driver and other passenger were not reported. Snow and ice conditions were present at the time of the accident.

■ Soldier died after he was ejected from the turret of the HMMWV he was riding in. The driver attempted to avoid a pothole and overturned the HMMWV, causing the deceased Soldier to be thrown from the vehicle. The driver, who was not wearing his seatbelt, suffered a fractured pelvis.



Personnel Injury

Class A

■ Soldier was presumed to have drowned when she was swept into the ocean by a large wave. The Soldier was standing with a group of people on a beach when the wave came in.

■ Two Soldiers were killed when the captured enemy munitions they were destroying detonated prematurely. No other details were provided.

■ Soldier collapsed and died following the 2-mile run portion of the APFT. No other details were provided.



Class A

■ Soldier suffered fatal

injuries when he lost control of his vehicle on an interstate exit ramp, striking a concrete barrier. The vehicle rolled over three times before coming to a stop. The Soldier was not wearing his seatbelt.

■ Soldier suffered a permanent total disability when his motorcycle collided with another vehicle, throwing him over the bike's handlebars. The accident occurred on post.

■ Soldier was killed when his vehicle collided head-on with a log truck. The Soldier, who was wearing his seatbelt, reportedly was speeding and passing slower vehicles when he hit the truck.

■ Soldier suffered fatal injuries when his vehicle ran off the roadway and struck a tree. Snow and ice conditions were reported at the time of the accident.

■ Soldier was killed when his vehicle struck a pickup truck head-on. No other details were provided.

■ Soldier suffered fatal injuries when his vehicle collided head-on with another vehicle. No other details were provided.

■ Soldier was killed when he lost control of his vehicle, causing it to cross the centerline and collide with another vehicle. No other details were provided.

■ Soldier died after his vehicle fell on top of him. The Soldier reportedly was having mechanical trouble with the vehicle and was working underneath it when the accident occurred.

Care to fill your canteen from this container?



Sure, someone wrote the words "Do Not Consume," "Coolant," and "Antifreeze" on the outside. But could you read that at night? These containers are designed so that Soldiers can identify them by touch in the dark. (Note the word "Water" molded on the side.) Drinking from this container could put a Soldier on ice—

forever!

Be Safe!



U.S. ARMY SAFETY CENTER