


Flightfax

ARMY AVIATION
RISK-MANAGEMENT
INFORMATION

DECEMBER 2002 + VOL 30 + NO 12



FY02

Aviation Safety Performance Review

Plus: 2002
Flightfax Index

Flightfax

ARMY AVIATION
RISK-MANAGEMENT
INFORMATION

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Page 4



Page 6



Page 8

CONTENTS

DASAF's Corner

Gearing Up Again—Safely 3

FY02 Aviation Safety
 Performance Review 4-5

Bird Strike Season 6

War Stories

Freezing Rain 7

ASO Corner

Watching My Girls Grow Up 8-10

News & Notes

Belleville 790 Combat Boot Approved ... 10

Investigators' Forum

Control of the Aircraft
 Was Never in Question 11

DES Announces New AKO
 Information Portal Access 12-13

2002 Flightfax Index 14-15

Winterize Yourself and Your Aircraft..... 16

POV FATALITIES

through 31 October

FY03

10

FY02

7

3-yr Avg

8

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James E. Simmons
 Brigadier General, US Army
 Commanding



Gearing Up Again—Safely

For many of us, the holidays are once again warm memories of celebrations with family and friends. For those of you deployed around the world, I trust you felt our gratitude for the tremendous sacrifices you and your families make every day for our country.

I'm confident that we all are refreshed, re-energized, and eager to kick off the New Year. But a word of caution is in order as operations at our training bases and in our theaters of operation get back into full swing. Environmental conditions—brownout and this season's snow and ice—can complicate even routine operations and missions. Last year, we had one Class A aviation accident with 16 injuries and three on-duty Class A ground accidents with two military fatalities and one civilian fatality during the month of January.

The aviation accident occurred during an NVG, multi-ship, terrain-flight approach to a known dusty landing strip. The CH-47D landed on its aft landing gear as a dust cloud enveloped the aircraft. As the forward landing gear made ground contact, the aircraft rolled into an irrigation ditch. As a result, the aircraft rolled right and the nose pitched down, causing the rotor systems to contact the ground. Fortunately there were no fatalities, but 16 personnel were injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

On the ground side, a tank commander was pinned and sustained fatal injuries when his armored combat vehicle overturned while en

route back to a cantonment area. The second Army fatality occurred when a National Guard Bureau soldier driving his POV home from duty following annual training was struck by a POV driven by a civilian who had fallen asleep at the wheel. In the third on-duty ground accident, the driver of a 5-ton Army motor vehicle was making a U-turn and struck a POV. The civilian driver received fatal injuries.

As we gear back up to full speed, I ask that each of you watch the hazards. They are present in our theaters of operation, they are present on the highways in our POVs, and they are present during each of our training events. If your risk management skills got a little rusty during the break, get your mindset back on those five simple steps it takes to effectively manage risks in whatever situation you are operating.

Accidents and injuries are preventable if each of us makes a concerted effort to identify and control hazards in even our most routine tasks. Conditions are constantly changing, and we must always be mindful that as those conditions change, new hazards come up. Stay alert and stay focused. We can reduce those four Class A on-duty accidents and three fatalities to zero this January.

Train hard and play hard, but be safe!

James E. Simmons

FY02 Aviation Safety Performance Review



Aviation safety suffered a setback in FY02. Accident rates, total losses, and fatalities all were on the increase. In FY02, Army Aviation experienced a 16-percent increase in Class A-C accidents over FY01. The change was primarily due to the upsurge in Class A accidents. The number of Class A accidents almost tripled from FY01 and was almost double the 3-year average. These accidents resulted in 17 Army fatalities, an increase of 6 over FY01.

In this article, we discuss recent centralized accident investigations conducted by the U.S. Army Safety Center and emphasize problem areas that must be addressed if we are to reverse this upward trend.

Analysis of FY02 Class A aviation accidents reveals that there is a chain of events leading to an accident. The events often began with a breakdown in leadership, standards, or discipline. This, coupled with lack of experience and continuous deployments, contributed to Army Aviation's worst Class A accident rate since Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Some of us wearing wings are not executing fundamental tasks, those taught to us in flight school, to standard.

Flight profile

The typical Class A flight accident occurred at night or was a single-ship mission. Generally, it was experienced pilots having these accidents. An instructor pilot (IP) was part of the crew in 22 percent of the cases. The IPs involved had an average of 2,669 total hours with 792 in type.

The average pilot in command (PC) had 1,421 total hours with 771 in type, and the average pilot (PI) had 997 total hours with 354 in type.

Airframes

The AH-64 experienced the greatest accident rate increase, with nine Class A accidents (see pie chart) and four fatalities versus no accidents or fatalities in FY01. The MH/CH-47 community experienced seven Class A accidents and eight fatalities versus zero in FY01. Over one-third (35 percent) of the FY02 Class A flight accidents occurred in AH-64 aircraft (6.99), closely followed by the CH-47D (6.78), MH-47 (5.91), and OH-58D (5.46).

Events

Collision with the ground accounted for 36 percent of all FY02 Class A flight accidents. The AH-64A accidents in Afghanistan and at Fort Carson both were the result of improper power management—the power required was greater than power available. Brownouts or whiteouts accounted for 24 percent of FY02 Class A flight accidents. The UH-60 accidents in Wyoming and at the National Training Center (NTC) are two examples of encountering brownout or whiteout conditions and subsequent failure to execute the appropriate aircrew training manual (ATM) procedure. Tree or wire strikes accounted for 16 percent of the Class A flight accidents. In addition, there were two accidents (8 percent) in Korea in which the crew unsuccessfully responded to inadvertent instrument meteorological conditions (IIMC).

Indicators of indiscipline


Human error caused the majority of the accidents. Systemic sources of this error can often be attributed to individual, crew, and leader indiscipline.

There are many examples of individual indiscipline in the planning, preparation, and execution phases of operations. Some examples of indiscipline during the planning and preparation

phases include IPs or PCs flying without the required performance planning, flying with incomplete or invalid weather briefings, and complacency in route planning. Additionally, failure to pre-flight and run-up using the appropriate checklist resulted in at least one, possibly two, OH-58D accidents due to the cyclic being locked out, killing two aviators and destroying two aircraft.

The following are examples of indiscipline during the execution phase: unauthorized deviations from the mission brief and failure to

FY02 Class A Aviation Accidents (flight, flight-related & aircraft-ground)



operate the aircraft in accordance with published standards; e.g., failure to execute a go-around when encountering whiteout or brownout conditions caused two UH-60 Class A accidents, destroying both aircraft. Failure to commit to IMC when continued VMC flight is no longer possible has resulted in one, possibly two, AH-64 accidents, killing two pilots and destroying both aircraft.

Crew indiscipline spans all phases of flight operations. In the planning and preparation phases, crews failed to perform table talk or to rehearse single-ship missions. In one class A accident, had the aircrew talked through the performance planning and compared it to the mission profile, they would have realized they were too heavy to accomplish their intended objectives. As a result, the aircraft was destroyed.

Crew indiscipline during execution has been demonstrated by crew members not holding each other accountable; e.g., pilots performing aggressive maneuvers not required for the mission profile and other crewmembers not challenging the pilot's actions. This form of indiscipline resulted in at least two destroyed aircraft.

Examples of undisciplined crew coordination include the improper transfer of controls of a flightworthy AH-64. The aircraft descended into the trees and crashed when each pilot assumed the other had the controls. A second example is a pilot failing to react to his crew chief's warning of aircraft drift. The UH-60 was destroyed when it struck a tree, the only obstacle in the landing zone.

Leaders must set and enforce standards. A breakdown in these aspects of leadership was evident in several FY02 accidents. In one specific accident a unit commander, who was also a PI, did not have an up-slip, nor did his crew fill out a risk management worksheet. In another single-ship accident, the unit commander was the mission briefer and he failed to conduct the required mission briefing. Instead, he simply initialed the flight log without ensuring the crew had conducted the required pre-mission planning. This commander was not aware of the flight route or intended landing zones (LZs). Had he required a back-brief, he could have identified his aircrew's lack of performance planning. Instead, the mission was flown with insufficient power, resulting in one destroyed aircraft.

Conclusion

Human error (pilot, crew, and leader) continues to be the number one cause of Army Aviation accidents. Indiscipline is a major factor in these accidents. Soldiers are dying and we are destroying expensive aircraft and equipment. Leaders, formal and informal, who understand and accept responsibility can help solve this Armywide problem. Effective leaders must ensure soldiers know the standards and enforce these standards, thereby improving aviation safety performance. If you are looking for a leader in your unit to make this happen, start by looking in the mirror. This will be your contribution to Army Aviation safety. ■

Editor's note: Statistics are current as of 5 December 2002.

—Operations and Training Directorates, U.S. Army Safety Center, DSN 558-1496 (334-255-1496)

Bird Strike Season

As summer left and the winter season began, so began the birds to make their way south, increasing the number of fowl in the air by thousands. As this photo shows from a recent strike in Wiesbaden, GE, the damage of one of those migratory Messerschmidts can be significant, to say nothing about if one comes through the windshield.

One of our own experienced a multiple bird strike during a night approach to their home airfield. Though damage resulted in costs of several thousand dollars, it could have been much worse. It could have been ingested into the engine (difficult, but not impossible), or lodged in the gear, or struck a flap, or any number of other scenarios.

Pilots have been seriously injured by birds of all sizes, and thousands of dollars in damages occur every year. I've hit three birds in my career without any damage: one in a helicopter, one in a single-engine airplane, and one in a twin-engine airplane.

In the first two, I had no warnings about "fowled" air hazards, but in the last one we did. Several other aircraft had taken off before me with no reports of strikes, so we tried our luck...without luck. When it hit, the sound made our hearts thump, stomachs quiver, and I'm not sure what other bodily functions may have gone awry, but suffice it to say that "fowl air" wasn't only outside! Fortunately, it had only bounced off the top of the cockpit windshield and after a maintenance tech cleared us, we continued the mission. ■

—CW5 R. Keith Lane, Brigade Safety Officer, HQ, 244th Avn Bde, Fort Sheridan, IL, 847-266-4423. CW5 Lane is the editor of the 244th Avn Bde Hawk Talk.



(Photo courtesy of CW4 Robert D. Petty, ASO, B Company, 1st MI BN, APO AE 09096.)

WAR Stories

Risk management lessons learned



Freezing Rain

In 1986, I was flying for the U.S. Army in Montana. We had been in Helena for over 2 weeks doing Special Ops work. I was assigned the task of inserting a team at an Air Base to the north and then returning to Helena.

We checked the weather, and the flight would have clear skies and cold temperatures en route and scattered clouds with some light snow on the way home. It should be visual flight rules (VFR) all the way.

The weather en route was perfect; but on the way back to Helena, clouds closed in and snow started getting real bad. We had a UH-60 and all icing equipment was working. After trying to get to the nearest airport or landing site, we contacted Flight Service and filed an en route IFR flight plan home.

Now this is where the best laid plans fall apart. The weather checked out to be good: no icing and the snow level would be below our flight path—we looked at all the options. We called and received our IFR clearance and climbed to altitude. Clear at flight level and smooth air. Cold as all get-out, our crew in the back was freezing, but it looked like the flight home would be a safe one.

As you know, Murphy will strike at any time. About 25 miles short of Helena, clouds closed in, all anti-ice was on and working—rotor, pitot heat, tail rotor system. And then we ran smack into freezing rain! Where did this come from?

No one had predicted this.

The aircraft started to collect ice. We tried climbing up. No help. Going lower in the mountains was out of the question. The weather was bad! No other route to go on, so we tried to get there as fast as possible.

Systems were working great, but visibility was limited through the windows. Power was starting to climb, so we knew the ice was building up on the aircraft.

To make a long story short, we made an IFR approach and landing. Tower told us to stay on the runway because we were throwing ice all over the place. I thought my heart would stop, and then my crew chief slapped me on the shoulder with a piece of ice that must have been 2 inches around and 1½ feet long. That came off the homing antenna!

I don't know what we could have done differently, except land when the snow was mentioned, but I don't think we could have explained that when another bird made it home before the unexplained freezing rain started. If it had been any other helicopter except the UH-60 with anti-icing systems, I would not be here to talk about it. Also, our maintenance officer (who we all thought was nuts for requiring the systems to work) made us check them all the time and then spent untold hours fixing them. We would have lost a ship and the crew if not for him. Needless to say, he earned my respect and I will always remember him for being the pain in the rear that saved us. ■

—Courtesy of HELIPROPS Newsletter and the author, James Szymanski (JSzymanski @bellhelicopter.textron.com)

Watching My Girls Grow Up

The story I am about to tell is much the same as any other that one would expect to see in a safety publication. The typical “it was just like any other day” line would apply to this story, except for one thing—this time, it involved me.

I am a company Aviation Safety Officer (ASO), and I address motorcycle safety in each month’s safety meetings. This past summer I coordinated a Motorcycle Safety Foundation class, which was taught exclusively for our unit personnel. We were all taking the correct steps to ride our motorcycles safely. Throughout the course, the instructor mentioned the “other guy” as a hazard we would face. As it turns out, it was the other guy that found me one fateful night. I just didn’t know it.

At work that day, the mission was an end-of-stage evaluation for two pilots completing their readiness level progression in the company. Just like any other day, we executed the flight debrief following the mission. We then sat around for several

hours explaining to our two newest pilots what life would be like in their day-to-day duties. After that, just like any other day, I hopped on my motorcycle and headed home. As I neared my neighborhood, I slowed, signaled, and turned left...just like any other day. The events that followed would forever alter my life and the lives of those around me.

About 30 minutes after I left work, my wife received a phone call informing her that I had suffered a serious injury in an accident just six houses from home. When she arrived at the scene, my injuries were too grotesque for her to look at. When she asked me what happened, I simply did not know. To this day, I still have difficulty recalling what happened, although I am starting to remember bits and pieces. What I have learned of the nights’ events, I hope others will learn from.

The car behind me had decided to cross the double-yellow line on this two-lane road in order to pass me just as I turned left. The right front of the other guy’s car cut through my left rear shock

and continued up the left side of my motorcycle, opening it up like a tin can. The inside of the engine was exposed, the gas tank caved in, the foot pegs were ripped off, and my left leg was nearly severed. On impact, I went up into the windshield and over the top of his car, while my motorcycle went under the right front tire. The driver continued on his merry way, uncaring as I lay bleeding to death in the opposite lane of traffic.

After being discovered by passers-by, I was taken to the military hospital on post and later flown to a university hospital approximately 200 miles away. That is where my left leg was amputated approximately 9 inches below the knee. As my wife was being driven to the university hospital, she received her second shocking phone call in a matter of just a few hours, informing her of the loss of my leg.

How could this happen? I had done everything right. I attended a Motorcycle Safety Foundation course, wore the proper personal protective equipment (PPE), and abided by all the laws. But the other

guy was out there that night and just happened to be behind me. I went from being an athletic 34-year-old to an amputee just trying to deal with reality.

The driver that struck my motorcycle that evening was apprehended a few miles down the road, driving home as if nothing had happened. Driving home with an imprint of my head on his windshield. He has been indicted on numerous charges and is awaiting trial. It was one of his many alcohol-related incidents and not his first DUI.

Since the accident, I have had a lot of time to reflect and listen to what people around me have to say. A lot of what I hear is enlightening, but some is absolutely shocking. I hear a lot of discussion and controversy regarding the use of helmets and other protective gear. Please read

the next sentence slowly and read it numerous times. *The reason I am here to write this article is because I was wearing ALL of the PPE required to be worn while riding a motorcycle.*

I have had several people tell me that if they were to lose a leg, they would rather just die. These same people have families. I promise you that the road to recovery has been and continues to be extremely difficult, especially for my family. But I guarantee you that they would rather deal with the road

to recovery than the road to the cemetery. That is why I agreed to write this story.

Before, as an ASO, I would always discuss motorcycle and POV safety in meetings, but now I have an understanding that I hope the readers of this article will never reach. I am much more adamant about getting others to understand

the importance of PPE. A traumatic event like this affects so many more people than just the victim. Believe me, I know. Had it not been for our friends and people we did not even know that well, this would have been so much more difficult. So, if you are reading this and thinking only about yourself, you are thinking WRONG!

Not too long ago, I saw the photos of my motorcycle and the other guy's car for the very first time. His windshield looked like someone had thrown a bowling ball at it. Unfortunately, the bowling ball was in the form of my head. Without a doubt, my helmet saved my life. Don't get me wrong, my scalp was sore for a while, but I did not suffer a major head injury. No skull fractures, no open wounds. I was just sore, a small price to pay considering what could have happened.

I also was wearing protective eyewear, a leather jacket, long pants, boots, leather gloves, and reflective material. As a result, I had no "road rash," no other broken

On impact, I went up into the windshield and over the top of his car, while my motorcycle went under the right front tire. The driver continued on his merry way, uncaring as I lay bleeding to death in the opposite lane of traffic.

bones, and my hands were not even injured. I have had a few people tell me that in certain situations, any amount of safety equipment will not save you. That may be correct, but this is my answer to him or her: *You do not have the luxury of choosing how and when the other guy meets you in an accident.* So, if you don't look as cool because you have "helmet head" and your hair is messed up, bring a hat. If wearing the proper PPE improves my chances of surviving and being there for my family, then give it to me.

I sustained an amputated leg. As tragic as that sounds, that was pretty much the extent of it. The recovery has

been trying at times, more so for my family and friends than me. To them, I apologize. I have learned that I am a work in progress and I accept that. This accident has definitely forced me to redefine the priorities in my life. Trust me, I would rather have the equipment that God gave me, but following the accident, so many other things in my life have gotten better. I was lucky—I was given a second chance.

I am up walking around on two legs again, thanks to some talented surgeons and an extremely talented prosthetist. I was able to go on vacation with my family for some much-needed "family healing"

time. I returned to my duties as company ASO within a few months of losing my leg and, if I have my way, I will fly for the U.S. Army again. I am able to go to dinner or a movie with my wife and even take the trash out and cut the grass so she doesn't have to.

At the end of the day, I drive home on that very road and make the same turn I made that night. Each time, I see the blood stain that is still on the road from my injury. Each time I look at that stain, I simply smile. I smile because, just like any other day, I'm watching my girls grow up. ■

—POC: CW3 Dana E. Jones recently attended the ASO course here at Fort Rucker. You can contact him at dj.jones4@us.army.mil



Belleville 790 Combat Boot Approved

Effective 26 Nov 02, the U.S. Army Aviation Center waives the requirement in AR 95-1, *Flight Regulations*, paragraph 8-9c(1) Leather Boots,

requiring the wear of leather boots when performing crew duties. This waiver specifically allows the wear of the Air Force Tan Combat Boot also known as the Belleville 790 series boot. No

other non-leather boot is authorized for wear. The Belleville 790 series is the same construction as the Infantry Combat Boot with tan dye applied to the leather. This will provide Aviation

warfighters a tan boot to be worn during flight operations with the tan aviation battle dress uniform in desert locations. ■

—POC: COL Ellis W. Golson, DSN 558-3203 (334-255-3203, GolsonE@rucker.army.mil).



Investigators' Forum

Written by accident investigators to provide major lessons learned from recent controlled accident investigations.

Control of the Aircraft Was Never in Question

A recent in-flight fire on an MH-47E aircraft resulted in significant thermal damage to the rotor brake, synchronization shafts, combining transmission, and surrounding fuselage. The crew was able to land the aircraft safely without additional damage to the aircraft, and the fire was extinguished by the airfield fire department.

Several system safety improvements in the H-47 fleet performed as envisioned and the crew was able to maintain control of the aircraft as a result. Noteworthy of these improvements was the change several years ago to the push-pull tubes in the tunnel cover area.

A fire in the 1980s resulted in the crew losing control of the aircraft as the previous aluminum push-pull tubes failed from thermal damage. In the accompanying photo, the current push-pull tubes, which are made of


stainless steel, exhibited only a layer of soot from the flames.

Although the temperature of the fire exceeded 1,200°F, the utility hydraulic lines, synchronization shafts, and push-pull tubes remained operational. The heat generated from the partial rotor brake engagement started a friction fire that scorched the combining transmission sump outer surface and caused the combining transmission oil to boil and overflow through the fill cap which in turn fed the fire.

The charred outer sump case exhibited a flaky layered texture. The inner sump case displayed a 2½-inch band of caked and discolored oil residue adjacent to the upper lip. The C-Box continued to run and did not fail. This fire also spread to the adjacent clam shell doors, aft cabin overhead paneling, the fuselage below the rotor brake assembly, the number one engine transmission to combining transmission drive shaft, and the combining transmission main body, including the cooling fan assembly.

The main point from all of this is the crew was able to maintain aircraft control during this in-flight emergency due to the system safety improvements. Units can help improve the reliability of our aircraft by continuing to submit QDRs on suspected or known part failures. This will allow our program management offices, aircraft manufacturers, and system safety engineers to correct system inadequacies, and therefore save people and equipment. ■

—Aviation Systems and Accident Investigation Division,
DSN 558-9858 (334-255-9858)




DES Announces New AKO Information Portal Access

Have you logged on to your Army Knowledge Online (AKO) account lately? AKO is the Army's portal for soldiers and civilian employees worldwide. Along with all its other useful features, you can now access the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (DES). This information portal replaced the

old DES website to enhance the capability of providing information to aviation units worldwide in a timely manner. When you "subscribe" to this portal, you will receive periodic E-mail notifications via AKO telling you what has changed. It will be much easier for you to keep up with current information from DES. Just follow the instructions below:

1. Log into Army Knowledge On-line (AKO) at (<http://www.us.army.mil>).



2. After your Home page opens on AKO, click on the green "Collaborate" tab.



3. Locate the box titled "Search for an Army Community Knowledge Center."
4. Type "DES" in the box. The box is located at the bottom of the page.

2002 Flightfax INDEX

ACCIDENT REPORTING

Haven't Gotten Around to Filling Out all those Forms? – Jan
Updated Rules on Accident Classifications – Jan

AIRCREW COORDINATION

Aircrew Coordination:
The Year in Review – Oct

AIRWORTHINESS RELEASES

In-Flight Medical Electronic Equipment Gets AWR Approval – Jan

ALSE

ALSE: Your Survival Could Depend on It! – Mar
How Important Is ALSE? – May
Investigators' Forum: The Need for Restraint – Jul
POSTER: ALSE – Jul
Investigators Corner:
ALSE Vest Check – May

ASO CORNER

FY03 ASO Training Schedule – Nov
Watching My Girls Grow Up – Dec

ATTACK HELICOPTERS

AH-64 Safety Performance Review – Aug
Apache Pilots Talk About HMD Issues (Survey Results) – Nov
Investigators' Forum: Was Anyone Flying the Aircraft? (AH-64) – Mar
USAARL to Conduct IHADSS Helmet Fit Survey – Mar

AWARDS

2001 AAAA Awards – Mar

BIRD STRIKE

Bird Strike Season – Dec

BROWNOUT

Flying Blind in a Cloud of Dust – Oct

CLOTHING

Cotton or Not? – Jan

COLD WEATHER

Aviation Maintenance in the Cold – Sep
Get Your Cold Weather Equipment Now – Jul
Surviving a Crash... and Confronting the Cold – Sep

COMMUNICATIONS EARPLUG (CEP)

The Care and Feeding of the CEP – Aug
The Effects of the Communication Earplug on Crew Coordination – May
The Use of the CEP in the UH-60 Black Hawk – Aug

CREW CORRDINATION

Don't Be Afraid to Say No – Jul
The 7 Habits of Highly Effective Aviators – May
The Care and Feeding of the CEP – Aug
Investigators' Forum: Was Anyone Flying the Aircraft? (AH-64) – Mar
Why Crew Mission Briefs are Essential – Aug

CREW REST

Creatures of the Night— Tricking the Aviator's Body into Night Alertness – Apr

DASAF CORNER

Combined Arms Training – May
Decision Making at the Appropriate Level – Apr
Enjoying Summer Activities Safely – July
Gearing Up Again— Safely – Dec
Let's Make It a Safe Summer – Jun
Recognizing Outstanding Soldiers and Civilians is Important – Aug
Safety is Readiness First Priority – Jan

Thanks for What You Do Every Day – Feb
The Basics of Accident Prevention – Sep
The Holiday Season and Reflection – Nov
The Number One Killer of Soldiers – Mar
When the Arrows are Pointing Up – Oct

DROOP STOP POUNDING

Avoiding Droop Stop Pounding in the Black Hawk – Nov

FLIGHT DATA RECORDERS

Care and Feeding of Your OH-58 Data Transfer Devices – Feb

FOD (FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE)

FOD—Find It! – Nov

HELMETS

Apache Pilots Talk About HMD Issues (Survey Results) – Nov
USAARL to Conduct IHADSS Helmet Fit Survey – Mar

HOT WEATHER

Aircraft Plus High Temperatures Can Equal Danger – Apr
Avoiding Heat Injuries – Apr
Fluid Replacement Guidelines for Warm-Weather Training – Apr
Warning: Summer Severe Weather Hazards – Mar

INADVERTENT DRIFT

Inadvertent Drift at a Hover—An All Too Familiar Accident Scenario – Mar

INADVERTENT INSTRUMENT METEOROLGICAL CONDITION (IIMC)

"We're Inadvertent IMC!" – Sep

INVESTIGATORS' FORUM

ALSE Vest Check – May
Been There, Done That (3 UH-60 accidents) – Nov
Sometimes the Envelope Pushes Back - Sep
The Need for Restraint – Jul
Two Minutes to Live or Die – Jul
Unauthorized Aircraft Modifications (Walkman radio) – Oct
Was Anyone Flying the Aircraft? (AH-64) - Mar

LETTERS FROM THE FIELD

Airborne Weather Radar - Feb

MAINTENANCE

Aviation Maintenance in the Cold – Sep
Notice: HEMTT Tanker Fuel Line Elbow – Jan
News & Notes: Remove Before Flight – Apr

MEDICAL

Better to Stay on the Ground! – Sep
Know What You're Taking (OTC Medications) – Jul

MISCELLANEOUS

A View from the Cockpit – May
Are You Mission Capable or Combat Ready? – Mar
DES Announces New AKO Information Portal Access – Dec
Emergency Egress: Not a Time for Errors - Mar
Familiarity Can Breed Overconfidence – Jul
FORSCOM ARMS Surveys 1QFY02 Review – Jan

Is the Glass Cockpit Safer? – Feb
Lead-the-Fleet Leads the Way – Oct
USASC Announces New Interactive Feature – Nov
Visual Illusions of the Desert – Apr
What Does Your Passenger Brief Contain? – Jan

NG & RC ISSUES

Call-up “Tool Kit” Available – Mar
Drill Weekend Safety – Mar
Plan Annual Training with Safety in Mind – Feb
Ready for the Future—The ARNG High Altitude Aviation Training Site – Apr

NCO CORNER

ALSE: Your Survival Could Depend on It! – Mar
Keep Our Soldiers Safe and Straight (SMA Tilley) – Aug
Sergeant Major of the Army Sends... – Jun
Tools—Let’s Talk Torque Wrenches – Jan

NEWS & NOTES

3rd Annual AGSE Users Conference – Feb
ATCs to Use Next Generation Doppler Radar – Jul
Attention MEDEVAC Commanders and Standardization Officers – Jan
Aviation Branch Gets New Position – Jun
Army Knowledge Online Features Flightfax – Feb
Belleville 790 Combat Boot Approved – Dec
Clarification on “VFR or VMC” article (July) – Sep
Ephedra – Sep
Farewell – Jun
FOD Nightmare – Jun
Remove Before Flight – Apr
SI/FI Conference – Jan
Special Edition Flight Information Bulletin – Feb
West Nile Virus – Sep

OBSERVATION/SCOUT HELICOPTERS

Care and Feeding of Your OH-58 Data Transfer

Devices – Feb
Inadvertent Drift at a Hover—An All Too Familiar Accident Scenario – Mar
Kiowa Warrior Revisited – Apr

PERFORMANCE

FY02 Aviation Safety Performance Review – Dec
Safety Center Aviation Mid-Year Review – Jun
“Why So Many Aviation Accidents?” – Jul

POSTERS

ALSE – Jul
Avoid Brownout – Oct
Kiowa Warrior in Snow – Dec
“Drive to Arrive” – Feb
“Helicopters versus Airplanes” – Apr
High Flight – Jan
In Memoriam (11 Sep 01) – Sep
It is Impossible to Accurately Measure the Results of Aviation Safety – May
It Takes More than Tanks, Guns, and Planes to Win – Aug
Mobile Training Team Schedule – Nov
POV Toolbox, 3rd Ed. 2002 – Mar

POV

Accident Prevention: Changing Attitudes and Behavior – Nov
“Every Drive Counts” – Jul
Gasoline and Static Electricity—A Bad Combination – Aug
POV Accident Changes Aviator’s Life – Jan
POV Toolbox, 3rd Ed. 2002 – Mar

POWER MANAGEMENT

Know All Your Limitations and Software Anomalies – Jan

PUBLICATIONS

A Call for Articles – Jul
Small Unit Safety Officer/NCO Guide – Apr
Useful Safety Center Tools (*Countermeasure*) – Apr

RADAR

Letter from the Field: Airborne Weather Radar – Feb

REFRACTIVE LASER SURGERY

WANTED: UH-60 Pilots – Feb

RISK MANAGEMENT

Tactical Risk Management – Aug
When Do the Rules Change? – Oct

SAFETY ALERT NOTIFICATIONS

Water Safety Trend – Jul

SAFETY MESSAGES

Recap of Selected 3rd & 4th Qtr FY02 – Oct

SAFETY PROGRAMS

Safety is Our Shared Mission – Jun

SEMA (Special Electronic Mission Aircraft)

SEMA Qualification Course – Jun

SHIPBOARD OPERATIONS

Deck Landings Revisited – Jun

SPATIAL DISORIENTATION (SD)

VFR or VMC? Let’s Be Clear About What We Mean! – Jul

SPOTLIGHT

AH-64 Safety Performance Review – Aug
UH-60 Safety Performance Review – Nov

TRAFFIC ALERT AND COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM

TCAS Tragedy – Nov

TRAINING & RISK MANAGEMENT

Commander’s Safety Course: The Road Ahead – Oct
Commander’s Safety Course Mandatory Before Taking

Unit Command – Feb
Mobile Training Teams Come to You...and the Price is Right – Apr
Risk Management and Flight Risk Assessment Worksheets – May

TRANSFORMATION

Aviation in the 21st Century – Feb
Safety and the Army Transformation Campaign—RAH-66 Comanche Design – Feb
Transforming the Force – Jun

USAARL RESEARCH

Apache Pilots Talk About HMD Issues (Survey Results) – Nov
Between the Ears: Cognitive Factors in the Cockpit – Oct
USAARL to Conduct IHADSS Helmet Fit Survey – Mar

UTILITY HELICOPTERS

Auxiliary Cabin Heater Duct Interference with Troop Seats – Aug
Avoiding Droop Stop Pounding in the Black Hawk – Nov
Black Hawk Rebuild – Feb
Investigators’ Forum: Been There, Done That – Nov
The Use of the CEP in the UH-60 Black Hawk – Aug
UH-60 Safety Performance Review – Nov


VIDEOS

“Drive to Arrive” – Feb
“Every Drive Counts” – Jul

WAR STORIES

Don’t Be Afraid to Say No – Jul
Freezing Rain – Dec
No Big Thing – Aug
Surviving a Crash...and Confronting the Cold – Sep
Timely Help From a Friend – Aug ■

Winterize Yourself and Your Aircraft



Control the risks — BE PREPARED!

- All aviation personnel should review Chapter 1 of FM 1-202, *Environmental Flight*, in preparation for Cold Weather Operations.
- Slips, trips, and falls increase exponentially in icy conditions. Don't rush. Walk slow and deliberately on slick surfaces.
- All personnel must dress appropriately for the conditions regardless of how little time they expect to remain in a cold environment. If you are delayed in conditions that you are not well prepared for, then there is the tendency to rush a task which leads to poor quality and potentially an injury or accident.
- Remove all snow, ice, and frost from aircraft, particularly potential projectiles thrown from rotating components. Damage to nearby equipment and aircraft, injury, or even death can occur.

—LTC Jeffrey Radke, Delaware Army National Guard, jeffrey.radke@de.ngb.army.mil