Flightfax
ARMY AVIATION RISK-MANAGEMENT INFORMATION
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

Was Anyone *Flying* the Aircraft?

Flightfax

ARMY AVIATION RISK-MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

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U.S. ARMY SAFETY CENTER

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

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James E. Simmons
Brigadier General, US Army
Commanding

DASAF's CORNER

from the Director of Army Safety

The number one killer of soldiers...

Isn't the bad guys we're fighting in our proclaimed war on terrorism. We are losing soldiers to an enemy we face every day, right here at home. Privately owned vehicle (POV) accidents have taken the lives of 36 soldiers during the first four months of this FY—a far greater number than have been killed in combat during Operation Enduring Freedom.

Although, compared to FY00, we closed out FY01 with an 11 percent decrease in POV fatalities, we still lost 99 soldiers in POV accidents. Each year from FY92 through FY01, POV accidents have accounted for approximately 60-65 percent of the total Army accident fatalities. We can, we must, do better.

The Army's senior leadership is adamant that the Army redouble its efforts in attacking POV accidents. The Sergeant Major of the Army is working with the NCO Corps to help commanders significantly reduce these losses. A 20-percent reduction from last year is an achievable goal. However, we must always be mindful that selection of a number is simply one metric for measuring safety performance, and **never** lose sight of the fact that numbers represent lives lost. The loss of even one soldier will always be one too many. That we lose soldiers in preventable POV accidents is totally unacceptable.

Most of the POV accidents this FY have been caused by the usual traffic hazards: speed, fatigue, and failure to wear seatbelts/helmets. Analysis continues to reveal that soldiers constantly underestimate their personal risk and overestimate their personal ability, causing errors relating to speed and fatigue.

FY01 data reveals that Army POV fatalities were 37 percent lower than the nation's demographically similar population. Male drivers under the age of 25 are the most likely age group to become involved in fatal accidents. A significant difference between the Army and the general public, of course, is that we as Army leaders can exert more control over soldier behavior. We have plenty of opportunities and authority to strongly influence the behavior and risk decisions of our young, most-at-risk soldiers. If we aren't doing that, then we should be.

POV accident prevention involves continual senior leader and NCO involvement. Division commanders should be briefed by the chain of command from squad leader to battalion commander on each POV fatality, and ensure that the information is shared with other local commanders. Leadership at all levels must take an active role in promoting safety awareness and risk management as the primary factors in preventing POV accidents and fatalities.

NCOs should know where every soldier is going while on leave, what he or she will be doing, and when every soldier will be returning to the unit. Make traffic safety

a discussion topic at meetings. Jump start the dialogue with one of the five new videos from the POV Accident Prevention "Drive to Arrive" Campaign. These videos are now available to download at our website, http://safety.army.mil, and will be available in VHS format at **http://afishp6.afis.osd.mil/dodimagery/davis/.**

POV accident prevention also requires that we —general and private alike—exhibit the individual self-discipline to obey traffic laws and all post-specific guidance regarding POV operation every day, every time we slide behind the wheel. Let's make "Drive to Arrive" more than a slogan. Let's put it into practice and help enhance combat readiness by neutralizing the threat that has for far too long been the number one killer of soldiers.

—BG James E. Simmons,
Director of Army Safety



Warning: Summer severe weather hazards

Cold weather hazards are slowly melting away, but summer weather flying hazards are stepping up to the plate to take their place in your checklist of things to worry about. Warmer weather hosts a variety of severe and even violent conditions that can develop rapidly: thunderstorms, hurricanes, tornadoes and their companions—turbulence, wind shear, hail, and (the most significant) lightning, which is probably the leading hazard associated with thunderstorms.

Before you encounter any of these severe weather phenomena that summer promises, prepare yourself. Brush up on known hazards and how to avoid or minimize the results.

The weather has no respect for experience or ratings, nor will it manifest sympathy for the inexperienced and unqualified. If you lack training, qualification, or adequate preparation, be prepared to pay the high price that severe weather will demand. While the weather may have no respect for your abilities, or the lack thereof, you can respect the hazards associated with severe weather conditions and learn to assess and manage risks accordingly. Never accept a weather risk if there is a control option that would lower that risk.

One of the best protections against accidentally encountering severe weather in flight is being forewarned of its possible existence or development. A thorough and complete preflight weather briefing is critical. Some operational weather Squadrons now have an Instrument Refresher Course (IRC) online, so that pilots can brush up on seasonal hazards. But the pilot's responsibility for avoiding severe weather does not end with the preflight briefing. It continues with constant in-flight weather observations, and careful attention to radio weather advisories along the route. Stay informed, stay alert. Forewarned, you are less likely to run into trouble.

Develop a healthy respect for nature's often unpredictable and awesome power. Don't let weather hazards spoil your warm weather flying.

Was Anyone Flying the Aircraft?

The crew of the AH-64 was using the Night Vision System on the last night of a forward deployed multinational training exercise. This accident aircraft moved into the Gun 2 position when the original Gun 2 developed a communications problem. As the accident aircraft moved into the Gun 2 position, the Troop Commander's aircraft moved into the Gun 3 position. The Squadron Commander's aircraft, a separate element providing command and control of the attack teams, moved into the Gun 4 position.

After passing the Squadron Release Point, the Instructor Pilot (IP), flying in the front seat of the accident aircraft, remembered his additional Gun 2 responsibilities and tried to contact the personnel on the ground. The IP directed the pilot (PI), who was flying the aircraft, to tune the radio, located in the rear cockpit, to the correct frequency to establish communications with the ground troops. Meanwhile the IP was using the Target Acquisition and Designation System to scan for targets and locate an approaching Attack by Fire position.

Since the radio frequency had not been preset, the PI assumed the request to tune the radio implied a transfer of controls. The PI released the controls, and began setting the appropriate frequency. He focused his attention on the radio, which left no one flying the aircraft. The PI recalled the IP asking, "What's going on?" just prior to impact. While transitioning from low-level to nap of the earth (NOE), the aircraft entered 90-foot trees at approximately 90 KIAS and crashed. The aircraft was destroyed, and the IP in the front seat was killed.

Lessons Learned

The primary concern of the pilot on the controls is flying the aircraft. All other concerns must be secondary. When on the controls, a pilot must properly scan and divide his attention between flying the aircraft and performing other crew duties. Recurring crew coordination training will reinforce the need for thorough communications among the crew.

Emergency Egress: Not A Time for Errors (It could be life or death)

Pretend you are a passenger in the back of the Black Hawk that has just been involved in a crash. You suddenly find yourself surrounded by a black, acrid smoke. The orange glow of a fire is growing brighter, and there is a corresponding increase in heat from the lower right side of the aircraft.

This passenger had been in the Army for over 15 years, and knew his way around, but he could not get the left side cabin door open. The heat was increasing rapidly. He maintained the presence of mind to go for the emergency window exit. He could not see clearly, so he felt his way in the smoke filled cabin to the window. The handle was gone from the door. *(See photo 1.)* He decided it probably had been broken off in the crash sequence.

Fortunately, another soldier involved in this mishap had egressed successfully from one of the pilot's doors. This soldier looked back to the burning aircraft. He saw hands frantically moving around the window on the inside. This brave soldier returned to the fire, forced the side door open (while sustaining severe burns), and aided the rescue of this passenger and several other survivors. The aircraft was ultimately consumed in the fire.

Later, the investigation board was unable to identify failure modes on the door emergency exits because the doors were destroyed in the fire. During the interview process, the passenger who attempted egress from the inside expanded on his experience with the broken missing handle. He correctly felt along the bottom of the side cargo door window and searched for the handle. He knew to pull up and rearward on the handle to release the window. *(See photo 2.)*

What went wrong?

Okay, crewmembers, here's a test. What is wrong here? This passenger was correct in his actions in the aircraft with which he was totally familiar—a UH-1. The problem is—he was in a UH-60!

The emergency egress handle on the UH-60 cargo door is below the center of the window. *(See photo 3.)* The handle is pulled to the rear to release the window *(photo 4)* and the window will fall away from the door. The passenger interviewed in the mishap was working at Corps level staff, and seldom received a detailed passenger briefing while flying with the Corps Commander. Although he had looked at the emergency egress

Photo 1

Photo 2

handle innumerable times, in the emergency he reverted back to what he had been trained on years before.

This is a test—It is only a test

Before you become too critical of this aviation unit, let me ask: How sharp are you? When was the last time YOU trained on emergency egress? When have YOU actually turned that handle and allowed the window to fall out of one of your unit's aircraft? Once a month? Once a year? Never? How about your passengers? How thorough a briefing do YOU provide them? Do you tell *and* show them where the exits are and how they work? How about planning this training for your annual unit Safety Stand-Down? What would be the cost of this training? It will cost a few feet of copper safety wire, a designated person/ persons to catch and replace the window each time one is released *(photo 5)*, and a little coordination with unit maintenance to have a TI replace and sign off the emergency exit handle safety wire at the end of training.

One more question to determine how aware you are of your surroundings. In the above paragraphs, we mentioned that you pull the handle to the rear. Correct? Yes, but— you only pull rearward on the left inside cabin doors. You pull forward on the right side cabin doors; or (like unscrewing a bottle) all emergency release actions are a left release, turn, or twist. You can see both the UH-1 handles in photo 1.

One last question for those of you that THINK you pay attention to detail. Go back to photos 1 and 2. Anything else worthy of note there that has not been covered so far? (Answer below.) Don't feel foolish. Feel confident. Training should be part of every day operations. DO IT!

—Mr. Joseph Licina (DSN 558-6893) and CW5 Robert (Scotty) Johnson (DSN 558-6881), Aircrew Protection Division, U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory, Fort Rucker, Alabama.

Answer: *The emergency egress handles in photos 1 and 2 are not marked (painted) with yellow and black stripes (per Chapter 9 in the aircraft -10).*

Photo 3

Photo 4


Photo 5

USAARL to conduct IHADSS helmet fit survey

A 2-hour flight can seem like 10 hours with a helmet hot spot. Every aviator knows that a good helmet fit enhances flight performance, and a poor fit may be a critical distracter in combat.

At present, most rotary-wing Army aviators use the HGU-56/P helmet. This helmet is relatively uncomplicated to fit, due to the large number of helmet sizes available and the use of thermoplastic liners (TPLs.) Once the proper helmet size is established from head circumference, TPLs may be adjusted if necessary. The process of fitting a HGU/56P is usually accomplished in minutes. It is relatively easy to maintain the fit once established. This is beneficial for the aviator because he/she will have the helmet throughout their aviation career.

One major exception to the use of the HGU-56/P is in the AH-64 Apache community. AH-64 aviators use the Integrated Helmet and Display Sighting System (IHADSS). The IHADSS helmet, at the time of its development, was lighter in weight and provided improved impact protection over the then-current SPH-4 series helmet. The IHADSS is the only helmet approved for the AH-64 and has been in use for over 20 years.

The study will consist of a questionnaire distributed through each Apache unit's safety officer or via mail.

A unique feature of the IHADSS helmet is that it serves as a platform for a Helmet Mounted Display (HMD). The HMD provides pilotage and fire control imagery and flight symbology. In order to view the HMD imagery, the helmet/HMD must be fitted such that the exit pupil of the HMD is properly aligned with the aviator's eye each time it is donned. This makes the fit and stability of the IHADSS helmet critical considerations. Achieving a proper fit of the IHADSS helmet is complicated by its intricate system of straps and pads. A proper, customized, repeatable fit is required in order to maintain the exit pupil position and optimize the resulting full Field of View (FOV). Fitting of the IHADSS helmet typically takes several hours to complete. This fitting process must be repeated every time aviators are transferred to a new duty station, as they *cannot* take the IHADSS helmet with them. It is part of the AH-64 aircraft system and is unit property.

Several studies conducted to investigate performance of the IHADSS system have identified helmet fit as an area of concern. However, no definitive study focusing on helmet fit has been conducted.

To begin to address this deficiency, the U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory (USAARL), Fort Rucker, Alabama, will be conducting a study on the fit, design, comfort, and performance of the IHADSS helmet. Data from this study will provide input into the complex issue of helmet fit and the use of HMDs. This will be useful in improving future HMD helmet designs such as the planned RAH-66 Comanche. In addition, this data will assist flight surgeons and unit commanders in addressing helmet fit issues that will enhance individual and unit readiness and performance.

The study will consist of a questionnaire distributed through each Apache unit's safety officer or via mail. All AH-64 Apache aviators are invited to participate in this study and will automatically receive a questionnaire by mail in March/April 2002. All information will be collected anonymously and will be used for research purposes only.

—Clarence E. Rash, research physicist, USAARL, DSN 588-6814/6866, (334) 255-6814/6866, Clarence.rash@se.amedd.army.mil.

Inadvertent Drift at a Hover—An All too Familiar Accident Scenario

Inadvertent drift at a hover and subsequent contact with obstacles in the flight path is an all too familiar and recurring accident scenario in the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior. A review of the Army Safety Center data base indicates, that between FY94 to FY01, the Army has recorded 5 Class A, 1 Class B, and 11 Class C accidents as a result of inadvertent drift and contact with obstacles. These accidents have resulted in four fatalities, three non-fatal injuries, and a combined injury and aircraft damage cost of over $40 million.

The OH-58D is arguably one of the most demanding cockpit workload intensive aircraft in the Army's inventory. The scout/attack mission it performs requires much of its flight profile in extended hovering modes at NOE altitudes, in the presence of terrain flight obstacles such as trees or rocks. The cockpit division of duties typically requires the pilot in the right seat to fly the aircraft, while the left seat pilot operates the Mast Mounted Sight and other aircraft systems. This often requires the left seat pilot to be totally focused heads-down inside the cockpit and thus unable to assist the pilot in detecting drift. In many of these scenarios, both pilots are at times heads-down in the cockpit. The design of the OH-58D is such that the pilot has no flight control aids to assist in maintaining a stabilized hover with the exception of the heading hold mode. The aircraft is equipped with a hover display page on the Multifunction Display, with velocity vectors and other aids to assist the pilot in detecting drift; however, many pilots fail to use these and other aids, such as the ANVIS Display Symbology System (ADSS), as aids to assist them in detecting and avoiding drift.

The most common scenario is drifting laterally or rearward during OGE hover, and striking the tail rotor or main rotor with an obstacle such as a tree, a rock or even another aircraft. Most of these scenarios involve simulated weapons engagements, transmitting digital reports, or situations requiring the crewmembers to be focused inside the aircraft, such as aerial observation. Crew experience ranged from SIP's with thousands of hours, to pilots with very little time.

Avoiding inadvertent drift in the OH-58D requires positive coordination between the crew *and* use of onboard systems to assist in drift detection. Some observations:

- The pilot not on the controls must immediately alert the pilot on the controls of drift. Both pilots must positively communicate to each other when they are focused inside the cockpit for more than 2-3 seconds.
- Remember the common tendency to drift forwards or backwards when masking or remasking vertically.
- Maintain sufficient distance from obstacles and other aircraft to allow for safe maneuvering. Give yourself some room to safely accommodate for drift. More than one aircraft should not occupy the same hovering or firing position.
- Maintain extra vigilance during NVG operations especially in zero illumination conditions. Visual cues are fewer in the low light conditions and crews must incorporate onboard systems to assist them.
- Use the MMS mode, hover/hover bob-up, heading hold, visual references, ADSS, or any combination to maintain position. Be sure to use proper scanning techniques to avoid spatial disorientation, obstacle avoidance, or becoming fixated on the Multifunction Display.
- Train frequently with the ADSS to make sure you are proficient with it. Remember it doesn't do you any good if you did not install it on your goggles prior to flight.

Inadvertent drift can be avoided. Vigilance, proper scanning, crew coordination, and use of onboard systems are a must in this high workload cockpit.

—Major Mike Cumbie,
USASC, DSN 558-3754
(334) 255-3754,
robert.cumbie@safetycenter.army.mil

Are you Mission Capable or Combat Ready?

I have been an Army aviator for nineteen years with seven assignments and two overseas deployments. Some of the units that I have been assigned to were mission capable, and some were combat ready. My definition of, "Mission Capable" means that a unit has the equipment, personnel and training to conduct operations. "Combat Ready" is all of that, plus attitude. When we believe in ourselves, in our fellow aviators, in the training program, and we are willing to put it to the test of the mission, we are combat ready.

This is the story of a combat ready attack battalion, and the effect that a Class "A" accident had on that unit.

I arrived in the attack battalion that was just fielding in 1994. Throughout the next several months I would get to know most of the personnel in the unit. They were a great bunch. There were the serious ones and the clowns, the experienced and the inexperienced, the leaders and the followers, the careerists, and those just trying something new.

Once we arrived at Fort Hood for CATB we were off and running. The next three months were filled with FTXs, gunnery, and battle drills. The average flight time per aviator was about 90 hours during the rotation. Our enlisted personnel were able to do the jobs they were trained to do without the external distractions found in garrison. We trained until radio silent attack missions became the norm. This can only happen when a unit can perform as one cohesive team. We were becoming an Attack Battalion that was mission capable, but we still had a long way to go before becoming Combat Ready.

After a two-week break, we were on the road to JRTC. Those that have been there, or to NTC, know that the pace of operations is breakneck, with long hours of planning for even the simplest of missions. We performed attack and cavalry operations, and deployed to forward assembly areas on many occasions leaving our support behind. We were beginning to rival the tactical proficiency of any unit that I had been a member of. The members of the unit built bonds between individuals, as well as between companies. We had reached the camaraderie that separates mediocre units from the truly great units. We crossed that threshold, and were combat ready.

Tragedy

During the next several months of training, I developed close friendships with several members of my company. Don and Mike were among these friends. Both were IPs and two of the best aviators I have served with. Don was the company clown while Mike was the free spirit who walked to a different drummer. They were both part of the team and I trusted them without reservation.

It was April. The battalion was conducting Hellfire gunnery before deploying on a JTF-6 exercise. We had done this type of attack mission fifty times as a company/battalion and always with great results. We knew the drill; deploy along a designated route until reaching the release point, occupy a battle position, engage vehicles along a road, and egress along the same route. Pretty simple, or so I thought. I was leading first platoon to the battle position that night and all was going as planned. We engaged our targets, went switches cold, and then made our egress. I called Mike, who was leading the second platoon, and advised him that the battle position was clear. We were making our way back to the FARP when we heard chalk three of the second flight calling over the radio. They had lost visual contact with the other aircraft and were trying to locate them. Soon, it became apparent that two aircraft were down. Later that night we learned that lead and Chalk Two had apparently drifted into one another in a deadly mid-air collision. The result: Mike and Don were gone, as well as the new company commander. The only survivor, a new platoon leader, walked away with minor injuries. Although my immediate concern was for my friends and their families I later realized that in the blink of an eye we had gone from combat ready to… nothing.

I learned three lessons from this tragedy.

■ First, the death of any soldier has a devastating effect on the personality of the unit. After the crash, we spent several months in shock. We lost the attitude that had made us a great

attack battalion. It was over a year, before enough new blood had come into the unit, that we began moving toward our former level of excellence.

■ Second, the immediate effect of a fatality is even greater on family members who at the home station. The spouses back home were scared and desperate for information. Commanders need to have a plan for how they will handle all of the unit's family members as well as fatality/injured personnel family members and how to disseminate information should an accident occur.

■ Third, It is hard to bury your friends. It only takes a blink of an eye for tragedy to strike. Should it happen, your life and your unit will change forever.

I have witnessed first hand that accidents have a great effect on a unit's readiness. Nothing stops a unit's momentum like a fatality. Our climb back to "combat ready" has been slow and sometimes frustrating but we'll get back.

—CW4 Erik A. Schimmer, Aviation Training Brigade, Fort Rucker, AL

Director's note:

As CW4 Schimmer's article so aptly points out, even the best-trained organizations can experience a shattering accident. As his unit and other units have found, the price of recovering from such an event is very high. It should make all of us re-look our commitment to risk management as a function of our mission planning and execution. The results of accidental risk can have just as profound an impact on a unit as the results of accepting tactical risk. An "ounce of prevention" far outweighs the "pounds of a cure." When we actively address both accidental and tactical risk in our planning and execution, and we have done everything within time and resources to reduce the price of accepting both these risks, then we truly are "Combat Ready" and prepared to execute our missions.

COL Mike Powell, Director of Operations, USASC

AAAA Awards

AAAA Avionics Award:
CW3 Bruce L. Brown, 1-52nd Aviation Regiment, Korea

Air Traffic Control Company of the Year Award: **E Company, 58th Aviation Regiment (ATS)**

Air Traffic Control Facility of the Year Award:
1-11th Aviation Regiment, Fort Rucker AL

Air Traffic Control Maintenance Technician of the Year Award: **CW3 Everette J. Smith II, HHD, 164th ATS Group unit, Seoul**

Air Traffic Control Manager of the Year Award: **SFC Randy T. Church, E Company, 58th Aviation Regiment (ATS), Germany**

Air Traffic Controller of the Year Award:
SPC Michael E, Intschert, 1st Battalion, 58th Aviation Regiment (ATS) Fort Bragg

Outstanding USMA Cadet of the Year Award:
2LT Joseph S. Minor

Outstanding ROTC Cadet of the Year Award:
2LT Dwayne W. Staples

Army Aviation Air/Sea Rescue Award:
50th Medical Company (Air Ambulance) 101st ABN DIV (AA), Fort Campbell

AAAA Aircraft Survivability Equipment Award:
CW3 Albert J. Maes, HHC, 1-210th Aviation Regiment, Fort Rucker

Aviation Medicine Award:
CPT Alexander G. Truesdell. HHS, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion, Germany

Fixed Wing Unit of the Year Award:
6-52nd Aviation Regiment , Joint Forces Training Base, Los Alamitos CA

Trainer of the Year Award:
CW4 Warren A. Aylworth, HHT 2-6 CAV, 11th Aviation Regiment, Germany

NCO CORNER

ALSE: Your Survival could depend on it!

Make sure survival kits have everything they need before they are needed.

Here's a checklist to use.

- Is the vest clean? A vest loses its flame-retardant properties if it's dirty.
- Does the distress marker light operate properly?
- Is the dial on the compass face intact?
- Does your pocketknife have a sharp blade?
- Is the water bag free of tears?
- Is the signaling mirror free of scratches?
- Are the survival kit and first aid items packed in separate zip-lock bags?
- Are nutrition items individually wrapped and sealed to prevent moisture damage?

If any problems exist, or if components are missing, refurbish the vests and order missing components from TM 55-1680-317-23&P and the latest project manager Aircrew Integrated Systems (PM ACIS) message AIS 00-02.

If you have the new aircrew integrated recovery survival armor vest and equipment (AIRSAVE), NSN 8415-01-442-1991, do your preventive maintenance checks and services like it says in TM 1-1680-361-10. The Airsave vest replaces the SRU-21/P and the survival armor recovery vest insert and packets (SARVIP).

ALSE techs, get a copy of AI500-02 by going to: **http://www.peoavn.redstone .army.mil/acis/index.htm/** Go to "Request a username/password" and follow the prompts. After a short interval for approval, you will have access to the web page. There you will be able to view and get copies of all current messages.

If you can't get on the internet,contact SSG Adam Byington, DSN 897-4262 (256) 313-4262, e-mail adam.byington@peoavn.redstone.army.mil; or John Jolly, PM-ACIS DSN 897-4262, (256) 313-4262, e-mail john.jolly@peoavn.redstone.army.mil

—PS Magazine

Here are the items you'll need for your survival vest:

Quantity	Item	NSN
1	Bag, storage, drinking water, 3 pts	8465-00-634-4499
1	Water, drinking,emergency, 4.2 ounces	8960-01-124-4543
1	Blanket, thermal/silver/OD	7210-00-935-6666
1	Compass, magnetic, unmounted, lensatic, luminous, M2	6605-01-196-6971
1	Fire starter, magnesium bar	4240-01-160-5618
1	Knife, multi-tool, Gerber(black)	5110-01-346-5341
1	Kit, signaling, A/P255-5A or L119	1370-00-490-7362
1	Light, marker, distress	6230-01-411-8535
1	Flashguard (AA) battery	6135-00-985-7845
1	Mirror, emergency signaling, 3X2 inches	6350-00-105-1252
1	Tourniquet, non-pneumatic	6515-00-383-0565
	Radio Set	
1 each	AN/PRC 90 or	5820-00-782-5308
1 each	AN/PRC-90-1 or	5820-01-158-6082
1 each	AN/PRC-90-2 or	5820-01-238-6603
1 each	AN/PRC-112 or	5820-01-279-5450
1 each	AN/PRC-112A or	5820-01-280-2117
1 each	AN/PRC-112C	5820-01-458-6018

Here are the first aid items you'll need:

Quantity	Item	NSN
1	Plastic bag	8105-00-837-7754
1	Adhesive tape, surgical, ½ in X 3 yd	6510-00-926-8881
1	Aluminum foil, heavy, 2 X 2 ft	9535-01-201-7014
10	Aspirin tablets	6505-00-118-1948
1	Bandage,adhesive	6510-00-913-7909
2	Bacitracin ointment, 10 oz.	6505-00-582-4191
10	Doxycycline hyclate caps	6505-00-009-5060
8	Loperamide hydrochloride caps	6505-01-238-5632
20	Cord,fibrous, 32/26 strand (550)	4020-00-246-0688
1	Dressing, first aid, field (camo)	6510-00-159-4883
4	Gloves,patient,exam	6515-01-364-8553
3	Insect repellent/sun screen .3 oz.	6840-01-452-9582
1	Moleskin, surgical 3X5-in pad	6510-00-203-6010
5	Pad, providone-iodine impregnated	6510-01-203-6285
6	Pin, safety	8315-00-787-8000
1	Plastic wrap, 12 X 36-inch sheet	8135-00-579-6489
½	Sponge, cellulose, Type II	7920-00-240-2559
1	Water purification tab	6850-00-985-7166

Drill Weekend Safety

It's been at least a month since your last drill weekend. It's always a busy Saturday morning trying to get the day organized. There is accountability of the soldiers, finalizing pay and personnel files, training briefings and staff meetings. So what role does safety play? Unit leaders must include safety and risk management in all aspects of a drill weekend. This begins with the drive to drill on Friday evening or Saturday morning. Some unit members travel long distances in hazardous conditions to attend drill. Commanders must be aware of this and tailor training schedules, if possible, to ensure that they do not put their soldiers at unnecessary risk. This does not imply that the training should be changed. However, consideration should be given to adjusting the schedule during inclement weather conditions, or anticipate conditions, such as fatigue, as a result of night training, to prevent personnel injury.

First line supervisors must enforce the safety policies of the unit commander. They must bear in mind that certain tasks have not been performed in at least 30 days and hazards could exist. A review of the standards is always a good idea. A unit wide safety brief should be conducted, as well as a section safety brief. A risk assessment should take place at least one month prior and updated as necessary. A thorough review of the training schedule should take place at the start of every drill weekend. Commanders need to stress safety and urge the unit not to take unnecessary risks.

Commanders are required to have a safety council meeting at least once a quarter. This is normally conducted during a drill weekend. This is a valuable tool to assist in unit safety management. All council members should adjust their schedules to attend these meetings.

Inactive Duty (IDT) or drill weekends are extremely busy. Commanders, leaders, and supervisors must all practice good risk management and not attempt to over task or over work their soldiers. They must look ahead and be aware of the hazards during drill, after work, and the fact that soldiers may travel long distances to return home.

Risk management must be included in every aspect of the drill weekend and encouraged in all aspects of off-duty periods as well.

—LTC Keith Cianfrani, USAR Liaison Officer, USASC

Call-Up "Tool Kit" Available

The Guard and Reserve Family Readiness Programs Toolkit is an important asset now available to families of service members being called to active duty or deploying.

The item is available as a printed product and on the internet at **www.defenselink.mil/ra/family/toolkit**

The tool kit is a standardized predeployment and mobilization handbook. It is an attempt to standardize information between services and the reserve component, so they can all use the same language when talking about deployment preparations.

ACCIDENT BRIEFS

Information based on preliminary reports of aircraft accidents

AH-64

Class C
A model

■ During ground taxi, APU Master Caution segment light illuminated followed by a loud report. Aircraft engine was shut down and fire handle pulled. Post flight inspection revealed evidence of fire.

C-12

Class B
C model

■ Crew was unsuccessful in their attempts to manually lower the landing gear during approach. Aircraft landed gear up with engines running and propellers turning.

CH-47

Class A
D model

■ Accident aircraft was chalk three in a flight of three landing to an unimproved LZ in very dusty conditions under NVGs. The crew lost sight of the ground and the aircraft landed hard severing the right front landing gear. The forward main rotor system struck the ground and the aircraft came to rest on its side. Fourteen passengers and crewmembers injured.

Class E

■ After landing, IP noticed FWD LCT (Longitudinal Cyclic Trim) was stuck in the retracted position. Attempts to program manually failed. Aircraft was taxied to parking and shutdown. Maintenance replaced LCT Actuator. Maintenance test flight OK, aircraft returned to service,

OH-58

Class C
C model

■ While conducting run-up procedures, throttle was advanced to 100%. During avionics checks, engine and rotor RPM rapidly accelerated to 120%. Pilot on the controls reduced throttle to 100% N2. The engine surged a second time to 120%. Crew initiated an emergency engine shutdown. Main rotor blades, engine and hub replaced.

DR model

■ In the aircraft's first start following an engine flush, the power turbine accelerated to 124% for seven seconds. Investigation revealed the overspeed was a result of attempting a start with FADEC switch in MANUAL mode. Engine replaced.

■ Foreign object (FOD) damaged aircraft during maintenance operational check run-up. Aerosol can had been left undetected under the tail rotor drive shaft cover. Drive shaft severed.

UH-1

Class C
V model

■ Flight of two in an echelon left formation were making an approach to an improved landing area to drop off troops. While on short final, at approximately 15 feet above ground level, lead aircraft began to slide left. Pilot on the controls in chalk 2 announced he was moving into trail formation for the landing. Trail aircraft encountered rotor wash from lead and was overtorqued. Torque was observed coming down through 60 PSI. Aircraft was landed without further incident.

Class D
H model

■ During run-on landing, aircraft's rear cross tube collapsed resulting in damage to the aft lower fuselage. Downgraded from preliminary Class C.

UH-60

Class C
A model

■ Aircraft was ground taxiing to the takeoff pad with rated student at the controls when master caution light and No. 1 engine oil pressure light illuminated. Instrument indications were normal and aircraft returned to parking. Post flight inspection revealed that oil cap had not been installed. Maintenance refilled oil and determined that further analysis was required by Corpus Christi Army Depot. Engine replaced and sent to CCAD.

■ Aircraft's tailwheel strut collapsed during taxi to parking. Postflight inspection revealed damage to tailboom and strut.

L model

■ Loud report was heard during flight. Precautionary landing was executed. Postflight inspection revealed a high speed shaft failure with collateral damage to other components. Aircraft was being recovered following maintenance and inspection for a prior precautionary landing for engine malfunction.

■ Loud report was heard during flight. Precautionary landing was executed. Postflight inspection revealed a high speed shaft failure with collateral damage to other components, as well as evidence of corrosion on the flex pad. Unit fleet inspections to be conducted to determine source of corrosion.

Class E
A model

■ Aircraft was turning final when the crew noticed the No.2 TGT increase to approximately 889 degrees Celsius. Other indications consisted of loss of the No.2 Engine Np and No.2 Torque indications,and increase in No.1 Engine Np and Nr to approximately 103%. Crew determined the malfunction to be a No.2 high side failure. Crew retarded the No.2 PCL to allow the No.2 TGT to decrease. Crew performed a roll on landing without incident. Maintenance personnel replaced the ECU as a fair wear and tear item and aircraft was returned to home station without further incident.

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

Toolbox

Privately Owned Vehicle Risk Management Toolbox

For Commanders, Leaders, Non-Commissioned Officers & Individuals

Third Edition

2002

http://safety.army.mil