COL. LANDGRAVE “TOM” SMITH and JACK VROCHER
2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division
Fort Riley, Kansas
The 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team “Dagger,” 1st Infantry Division, executed a successful and safer-than-average large-scale combat operations (LSCO) National Training Center (NTC) rotation recently, primarily due to a deliberate approach to risk management and engaged leadership at echelon. Brigade and battalion leadership established the brigade’s approach to NTC Rotation 24-11 beginning at the leader training program (LTP) executed in June 2024. The base pillars of the approach, messaged early, were to attack NTC and seize the training opportunity, get better every day and do so deliberately with prudent control measures to manage risk. Based on the training progression leading up to the rotation, the Dagger Brigade normalized discussions about risk early, incorporating safety into all phases of the operation. This approach yielded positive results with lessons learned regarding engaged leadership, deliberate control measures to mitigate risk and ownership of risk.
There were two factors the Dagger Brigade remained cognizant of in preparation for NTC. First, the brigade entered NTC after a train-up that certified platoons through platoon maneuver situational training (PLT STX) and live-fire exercises (LFX), but that did not include company-level maneuver or combined arms live-fire exercises (CALFEXs). The second factor of note was the summer transition in the months leading up to the rotation. Between April and August, the team welcomed new leadership at every echelon, including a new brigade commander, six out of seven squadron and battalion commanders, two battalion command sergeants major and a group of new majors. A focus on these two aspects, collective task proficiency and key leader transition largely shaped risk discussions across the brigade.
Dagger Brigade safety at NTC
Dagger Brigade executed a successful, safe rotation during NTC 24-11. While not without mishaps, the brigade deliberately deployed, staged and executed sustained operations in tactical conditions, regenerated combat power and redeployed safely. The NTC tracks stats over a five-year period by quarter, and each quarter average is different — mostly based on weather conditions. There are an average of 112 mishaps at NTC during the fourth quarter — Dagger Brigade had 98 mishaps. Similarly, the average number of Class C mishaps during fourth-quarter rotations is 16 — Dagger Brigade had eight. While the Dagger Brigade had nearly 100 mishaps, the severity of most of those remained relatively low.
- The No. 1 mishap we experienced was slips, trips and falls (41). Watch where you are walking and adjust to the terrain.
- The No. 2 most common mishap was struck-by/crushed-by incidents. Watch all doors on up-armored vehicles (Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV), Light Medium Tactical Vehicles (LMTV)) and account for incline, decline and uneven areas in the environment.
- The No. 3 most common mishap was primarily hand injuries due to trailers and shifting trailer loads during recovery using M984s.
- It is imperative that leaders and operators build a working understanding of the risks associated with JLTVs in the training area, particularly the hazards presented by the high center of gravity and blind spots.
Preparation
While the brigade as a whole was relatively experienced in deployment and redeployment activities, leadership acknowledged the level of resident experience across the formation and shaped discussions to meet it. The brigade placed emphasis on normalizing safety in operations, developing engaged leadership, deliberate movement and placing leaders forward.
Normalizing safety
The brigade onboarded a new brigade safety officer, Jack Vrocher, in June 2024. Coming onboard, the initial counsel and guidance for safety was to act as an additive ingredient to success. Significant energy was placed in fostering strong relationships within the brigade between brigade safety and battalions down to the platoon level, as well as with division safety, to enable collaboration and sharing lessons learned. Jack was effectively integrated into the brigade leadership at every echelon and supervised key friction points, which changed as the brigade developed proficiency. For example, as the brigade began receiving equipment at Yermo Railhead, Jack provided support to the battalion in charge. However, when the brigade shifted focus to moving equipment along Manix Trail, Jack assisted with checking licenses and ensuring convoys were prepared to conduct the 40-mile movement.
Engaged leadership
The Dagger Brigade’s concept for articulating engaged leadership evolved in the lead-up to and through the execution of NTC 24-11. Gunnery and collective training events provided an opportunity to establish the definition of engaged leadership in the Dagger Brigade. The framework for this concept was centered on driving junior leaders to know their teams and Soldiers, make accurate assessments of their proficiency, understand the mission, recognize risks and take action to mitigate those risks. This boiled down to two questions: “Did you know/should you have known?” and “What did you do/what should you have done about it?” Oriented on developing empowered leaders with ownership at their level, this framework was further refined to account for the need to be directive to develop leaders and then follow through with observation and feedback.
Deliberate movement
Due to demand for railcars to support multiple missions across the Army, the Dagger Brigade initiated a movement to NTC approximately one week prior to a standard movement and reception, staging and onward integration (RSOI) timeline. This requirement ultimately presented an opportunity for an extended RSOI that enabled both the generation of combat power and safe execution in preparation for force-on-force. The result was a deliberately established command and control of deployment nodes with consistent, stable leadership, the establishment of deliberate procedures and checks, and additional time to reinforce driver training on the terrain at NTC. All these had a positive effect on overall risk mitigation and safety. In the absence of an extended RSOI period, the brigade will place emphasis on putting these measures in place through deliberate planning and rehearsal prior to future rotations.
Leaders forward
The early movement to NTC also changed the way the brigade viewed the flow of battalion-level leadership into deployment nodes at Yermo and Fort Irwin. Brigade and battalion leadership often arrive at NTC at or near the mid-point of PAX flow for their formations, with RSOI well underway. The traditional logic driving this pattern is based on providing time for brigade and battalion field-grade leaders to set the theater, establish systems and begin generating combat power to prepare the formation for combat operations. The early movement and extended RSOI led to senior leaders moving earlier in the model. Formations benefited from the direct leadership provided by battalion commanders and, more importantly, command sergeants major as the most experienced members of the team.
Key safety observations
- Engaged leadership is the standard at all deployment nodes. Maximize maintenance and recovery operations during the NTC rotation and at home station to limit mishaps during high-OPTEMPO missions.
- Stress personal protective equipment (PPE), such as the Army combat helmet, eye and ear protection, and gloves, and enforce the standard early with precombat checks and inspections (PCCs/PCIs).
- Stress standardized drills and the commands required, reiterated by all Soldiers assisting at loading/unloading ramps (e.g., clear and ramp down) when transporting equipment via commercial lowboys or heavy equipment transport systems (HETS).
- Standardize movement from Yermo to Fort Irwin with consistent command and control (maintain the same officers in charge (OICs) and noncommissioned officers in charge (NCOICs)) to sustain experience in routine operations.
- Build capacity to support alternate methods of delivery for vehicles with mechanical issues (line haul if needed). This prevents rushing to failure in the interest of “making it happen.”
- Check military and civilian driver’s licenses prior to any convoy operations, ensuring proficient operators for specific equipment and effectively limiting mishaps due to unfamiliarity with vehicles and equipment.
- In the implementation of U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) guidance for VCs/drivers, assign NCOs to VC vehicles pulling trailers (this was brigade guidance) as well as operator-VC pairing. Pair an experienced specialist with an experienced specialist or a private first class with an NCO.
- Conduct night driver training for familiarization with the terrain for the environment you will be operating in designed by brigade and battalion master drivers in collaboration.
- During movement activities and RSOI, conduct nightly leaders’ synchs with brigade and battalion leaders to discuss the next 24 hours, lessons learned, and any safety mishaps and mitigation measures.
Execution
In execution, Dagger Brigade approached risk during the rotation by adopting a time-phased approach to recognizing contributing factors to risk to force, linking tactical and accidental risk in planning and execution, and deliberately defining the acceptable level of accepted risk at echelon.
Phased approach to risk
The brigade identified risk in four broad phases as it approached the force-on-force maneuver. The first phase encompassed the first 72-96 hours of operation (TD 0-3), and the most significant factor was the lack of operator and leader maneuver experience across rough terrain in a tactical environment. The second identified phase spanned the middle of the force-on-force period (TD 4-6). Leaders and their formations learn at an exponential rate in continuous operations, and during this period, the risk of overconfidence influencing risk decisions and the desire to do things quickly and that provided the most tactical advantage potentially outpaced growth in experience.
The third identified phase began at approximately TD 6-7 and continued through the transition to force-on-force under live-fire conditions. In this period, fatigue became the prevalent contributing factor to risk, surpassing experience and aggressive maneuver. Finally, the fourth phase of operations included regeneration and redeployment, a period heavily influenced by pressure to rapidly improve the OR rate and a tendency to rush home. This phased approach led to guidance in plans and controls in execution tailored to mitigate risk with an emphasis on the central component in each phase. Examples include directed routes/axis, timelines, conditions required for execution, and directed rehearsals and PCCs/PCIs.
Linking accidental and tactical risk
Accidental risk management is not administrative in nature and cannot be divorced from tactical plans and execution. A risk to force that reduces combat power or has an adverse effect on tempo will ultimately manifest as a risk to the mission. For example, units are expected to establish support-by-fire positions to mitigate risk to force and enable maneuver, but company-level leaders often fail to make the connection to deliberate risk management. In addition to the accidental risks of maneuvering tactically over broken terrain, fratricide provides another example of this linkage. The brigade had a total of 13 incidents of simulated fratricide throughout the formation, with the greatest contributing factors identified as fatigue, loss of situational awareness or failure to properly identify vehicles. Direct fire control, from planning to crew-level execution, is an exercise in risk mitigation. Leaders must account for the risk by establishing and enforcing effective controls to maneuver effectively and safeguard the formation.
Deliberate acceptance of risk
In planning, brigade and battalion leadership defined what risk was theirs to assume and what risk could be assumed by subordinate commanders. These decisions were informed by an understanding of unit proficiency, current state of fatigue and tactical situation. One early example was the decision to allow 5th Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment to enter the Valley of Death during a period of darkness by jumping “the shelf,” a particularly treacherous defile that provides a significant tactical advantage, but at high risk to the force based on leader and crew experience.
Key safety observations
- Develop the role of junior leaders and NCOs in preparing formations for combat. PCCs and PCIs must be prescribed and a deliberate part of units’ priorities of work (load plans, restraints, optics and driving aids and weapons systems).
- Fatigue is a factor. Subordinate leadership must ensure fighter management is incorporated into the priorities of work and planning, and that work/rest cycles are adhered to.
- Don’t be in a hurry. Empower leaders to be deliberate with all movement. If unsure about the terrain, get out and ground guide. Increase following distances for movements under low visibility and plan for increased transit times.
- Accurately assess proficiency and then build confidence in maneuver. While this is ideally accomplished through maneuver operations prior to combat training center rotations, familiarizing service members with new equipment and building trust to ensure safe operations in austere conditions is critical.
- Focus on sustainment formations and command and control nodes. Due to the mission of these formations and the equipment provided them, these two formations are at higher accidental risk during continuous operations in a tactical environment. Ensure these formations are afforded the time, repetitions and equipment necessary to build proficiency to operate safely.
The way ahead
The most significant positive common variable where the brigade was successful in operating safely was engaged leadership. While it had challenges, those generally occurred when the drive to accomplish the mission eclipsed a leader’s understanding of risk and the implementation of controls at the proper echelon, such as excess movement and longer hours to fight through redundant actions resulting in fatigue, stress and unsafe acts. This reinforces the necessity of leader development programs to build a holistic culture of risk mitigation that incorporates tactical and accidental risk combined.
- Brigade and battalion leader discussions of near misses (Class C and D mishaps) within the last month/quarter will highlight the lack of or failed controlled measures and mitigation measures. This is black-box thinking that requires a culture of psychological safety.
- Junior leader development will emphasize being directive on PCCs and PCIs and highlighting the differences between them (who does what, when, why).
- Dagger Brigade will seek to recognize Soldiers who intervene in risky situations, as well as reinforce Soldiers/units in accordance with the Army Safety Awards Program in accordance with DA Pam 385-10. This includes unit safety, driver safety and putting controls in place in a garrison environment.
The rotation at NTC 24-11 provided a concrete experience for the brigade with lessons learned about engaged leadership’s role in risk mitigation and the need to develop it across multiple contexts. Going forward, the brigade will leverage its NTC experience to inform leader development with the aim of better understanding and acting to mitigate risk in context, from tactical maneuvering to caring for Soldiers and families in garrison.