SGT. MAJ. NATHAN YORK
335th Signal Command (Theater)
U.S. Army Reserve
East Point, Georgia
The mission was to haul fuel to Dahuk and conduct refueling operations for the 1st Motorized Transportation Regiment (MTR). This called for three U.S. M1025 converted gun trucks, two Iraqi army fuelers and four 7-ton cargo trucks to travel about 60 miles from Al Kisik, Iraq, to the Kurdish city of Dahuk. The convoy was set to return that same afternoon along the same route with 15 additional vehicles. One oversight on the return mission, however, would tarnish an otherwise successful movement.
Al Kisik is a small town nestled between Mosul and Tal Afar and had become the site where Iraqi military forces were trained and based to support sustainment and stability operations. Among these newly formed units stood the 3rd MTR. For the 3rd MTR — which was still in training and struggling with the growing pains of leadership development, equipment acquisition and Soldiers learning the most basic of combat skills — this was its first real-world mission.
The pre-convoy briefing and preparation began at 0600, and the convoy rolled out the front gate just after sun-up. The ride to Dahuk went smoothly and, at this point, it appeared the planning was a complete success. Immediately following the refueling operation, NCOs and Iraqi officers began forming the Soldiers and vehicles for the return trip. The Iraqi leaders then organized the march order and conducted pre-convoy checks and briefings. Unfortunately, a few problems were left unchecked.
The size of the convoy, number of inexperienced drivers and unknown mechanical condition of the vehicles were not addressed in the pre-convoy checks and briefings. About 30 miles into the return march to Al Kisik, the convoy experienced its first mechanical failure — followed by another and then another. The Iraqi soldiers struggled to recover the vehicles as they broke down. At the same time, Iraqi leaders fought to control communications as the remainder of the convoy continued ahead, leaving drivers and broken vehicles along a 15-mile stretch of highway.
Eventually, all the recovery equipment was expended, but vehicles continued to fail. As a result, the return road march lasted four hours longer than planned. Fortunately, no lives were lost and injuries were limited to smashed fingers and minor cuts.
Lessons learned
What caused a solid mission to go so unexpectedly wrong? Leaders failed to identify experienced drivers or conduct thorough pre-convoy checks and briefings on the expanded convoy. They also failed to ensure there was an adequate number of recovery vehicles accompanying the convoy should vehicles break down. Additionally, Iraqi junior leadership failed to control the convoy and communications. As a result, radio traffic quickly became cluttered with each breakdown.
There are several measures that can be taken to make convoy missions more successful, including:
- Pair experienced drivers with inexperienced co-drivers to use manpower more effectively.
- Provide radio communication training to reduce the chatter on the net.
- Tailor pre-convoy checks and briefings specifically for each and every convoy. Don’t merely restate previous briefings and checklists.
- Plan to have the correct recovery equipment in the convoy — and in sufficient amounts — to recover possible losses.
- Ensure the unit maintenance plan accounts for extended mission times and vehicles are in proper working order before departure.
Ultimately, the mission was accomplished and all vehicles recovered. The lessons learned that night by the 3rd MTR Soldiers and leaders proved invaluable as the unit began accepting missions to support U.S. and Iraqi forces throughout northern Iraq.