CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 2 ALLEN JONES
B Company, 1st Battalion, 137th Aviation Regiment
Ohio Army National Guard
Columbus, Ohio
My crew and I were on a routine instrument flight rules training mission. Our flight profile was 80 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) at roughly 300 feet, followed by a climb to 3,000 feet and accelerating to a planned airspeed of 120 KIAS. My co-pilot was flying the aircraft and monitoring the instruments.
I was backing up the co-pilot as we climbed when we suddenly heard a loud bang and felt our Black Hawk yaw to the right. We immediately got two master caution lights and the No. 1 GEN CAUTION light. At the time, I was a young pilot with 24 hours of pilot in command (PC) time and 450 hours total time. My first concern, even before I noticed the caution lights, was that we might lose control. I didn’t know what caused the loud bang, but I assumed whatever it was also caused the yaw.
My co-pilot announced the right yaw was uncommanded and his master caution light was illuminated. I also announced that I had a master caution light and asked if he could maintain control of the aircraft. He answered, “Yes,” and I told him to continue with the last clearance given. I briefly monitored my instruments to ensure my co-pilot was continuing to the assigned altitude and heading.
Once I was comfortable that we weren’t descending toward terrain or obstacles, I started concentrating inside the cockpit to diagnose the master caution lights. Ultimately, only the No. 1 GEN CAUTION light remained on, so we continued as directed by air traffic control. I went through the emergency procedure used for a No. 1 GEN CAUTION light and then backed up myself with the checklist. Once I determined the No. 1 generator had indeed failed, I called the tower. I informed the air traffic controller that we had experienced a generator failure, but at this point it didn’t seem to be affecting our aircraft.
I asked that they provide vectors for the ILS 23 (instrument landing system 23) approach back to the airport. They immediately switched us to approach control for vectors back to the airport. We executed the approach successfully and landed safely.
As it turned out, the failure we experienced was relatively minor in the grand scheme of things. However, it was still a situation requiring emergency procedures to be performed according to the operator’s manual. My co-pilot acted exactly how I expected him to and performed the necessary actions to ensure this remained a relatively uneventful failure.
I attribute the effectiveness of our actions in the cockpit to a very thorough crew briefing. During that briefing, I stated that in the event of an emergency under instrument meteorological conditions, the pilot on the controls would continue to fly the aircraft and maintain the last assigned heading and altitude given by air traffic control. The pilot not on the controls would serve as a backup and diagnose the emergency. Once the emergency was identified, we would perform the required emergency procedures, backing up our actions with the checklist.
I credit our success as a crew to this simple but concise portion of the briefing. Had I not explained to my co-pilot what I expected from him, and without him executing the actions as briefed, confusion would have reigned in the cockpit — and that’s not good. A little confusion inside the aircraft can lead to a huge collision with the ground. By staying calm and following our crew brief, we landed the aircraft safely, ensuring both it and we survived to fly another day.