CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 2 CATHERINE BEAUFORT
C Company, 1-147th Aviation Battalion
Michigan Army National Guard
Grand Ledge, Michigan
I was three months home from flight school when I completed my readiness level (RL) progression checklist and became a brand-new RL-1 Army aviator. The flight school anxiety that was my personality for the last two years slowly began to melt away like the northern Michigan winter in which I had spent my progression operating. In fulfillment of the progression checklist and requirements for training per the unit’s standard operating procedures, I was signed off on degraded visual environment (DVE) operations after an evaluation of my proficiency in the snow, but I was eager to test my new skills in the dust to compare experiences.
My favorite CW4 instructor pilot (IP) and I started our journey to the local training area with two crew chiefs in tow, in search of some dust clouds. The sun was fully below the horizon when we selected the first landing zone (LZ), called Engineer Valley. It was a well-known location on the installation, and all four crewmembers had experience landing in this LZ. On its long axis, it provided roughly 650 meters of usable landing space, primarily consisted of sand and dirt with small grassy patches, and its known obstacles included small poles fixed into the ground and shrubs scattered throughout the area.
Upon arrival, I selected a touch-down point where there did not appear to be any major hazards, and the surface area looked to be flat and smooth in the center of the LZ. I verbally communicated my thought process for choosing that spot, and all crewmembers agreed. I initiated my approach, set my controls for an attitude compatible with a DVE landing, rode the attitude in and heard the familiar call of a dust cloud forming — “At the tail … my window … your window…” Over the internal communication system, I heard my IP say, “Looking good,” and I felt confident I was about to ace my first total brownout landing. This feeling quickly vanished when our wheels touched down.
Under night vision goggles (NVGs), none of us could tell the area I picked was going to be soft, deep sand that grabbed us by the wheels the second we touched down. As the aircraft abruptly stopped, all of us were thrown forward and caught by our harnesses, except one crew chief. The harness locks on the right-rear crew seat malfunctioned, and he was thrown face-first into the gun mount. Thankfully, he sustained only minor injuries that did not require medical attention. There was no damage to the aircraft, but as a crew, we recognized the situation could have been much worse.
Lessons learned
During the planning stages of this flight, both rated crewmembers, the mission briefing officer and the mission approval authority failed to identify the associated complacency risk. It was assumed that since everyone previously operated in this LZ in a training area used frequently, reconnaissance in day visual flight rules conditions was not necessary to determine the suitability of the area prior to attempting NVG operations. Assessing a landing environment, including the texture and composition of sandy areas, prior to touchdown is paramount, as the state of these types of LZs can and do change regularly, which can impact landing dynamics greatly. The perceived familiarity of the area led to the crewmembers’ false confidence. Had we taken the time to depart slightly earlier in the day to perform a brief area recon, we may have been able to spot and avoid hazards or had the additional information to adjust our landing for the conditions as necessary.
Additionally, it would have been beneficial to have a more extensive conversation regarding my experience level and tie in the concept of the crawl/walk/run phases of training. Due to my low total and NVG flight time and inexperience with identifying hazards under goggles, instead of rushing to failure and skipping steps, we should have started with the “crawl” phase of training by building a solid foundation of knowledge and skills through basic concepts and fundamentals (i.e., a guided step-by-step of LZ recon in day conditions). With a little practice, we could have implemented the “walk” phase and moved on to more realistic and challenging exercises (i.e., identifying the same hazards under NVGs during LZ recon), and then the “run” phase (i.e., a hasty LZ recon in real time).
It is always important to incorporate lessons learned into your risk management process to mitigate similar incidents in the future and continuously improve upon and foster a culture of safety, operational effectiveness and collaborative decision-making. Complacency can affect anyone at any hour level, but returning to the fundamentals and slowing down when able can save lives. Thankfully, this flight did not turn catastrophic, but it certainly could have under slightly different conditions. Stay humble and always do the right thing.