CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 2 JACOB MONICA
6th Squadron, 8th Calvary Regiment
2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team
Fort Stewart, Georgia

In early 2021, I was the new PC non-commissioned officer in charge when a Gray Eagle MQ-1C crashed through our Colorado airfield’s perimeter fence after failing to lift off during an automatic takeoff and landing system (ATLS) launch. The aircraft sustained Class A damage totaling more than $7.3 million. On the surface, the root cause was clear (pun unintended): ice contamination on the wings. But the underlying issues that allowed the aircraft to reach the runway in that state point to a broader challenge in Army aviation — the danger of complacency and the limits of procedural risk management when environmental factors are underestimated.

The day began like many others during winter operations. The aircraft was stored in a heated hangar overnight before being rolled onto the ramp at about 0415. The outside temperature was 23 degrees Fahrenheit, while the hangar remained near 70 degrees. As the aircraft transitioned from warm to cold air, condensation formed on the wing surfaces and subsequently froze. Despite clear warnings in technical publications and work packages stating that “all snow, frost, and ice must be removed from airframe surfaces prior to flight,” the aircraft launched without deicing from the crew chief.

There were no fault indications, system advisories or procedural hang-ups during the preflight process. Weather briefings showed clear skies and light winds. To the operator and maintainer, it looked like a green-light mission. Unfortunately, it wasn’t. As the MQ-1C accelerated down the runway under ATLS control, it failed to generate lift. Despite reaching sufficient airspeed, the aircraft remained on the ground. An abort was called, but by then, the runway was nearly gone.

The aircraft overran the surface, struck a berm and collided with the perimeter fence. Post-mishap analysis confirmed that wing-surface icing prevented proper airflow and lift generation. The icing, though not immediately visible in the early morning darkness, was enough to turn a routine mission into a total loss.

Risk management breakdown

This event highlights a common blind spot in aviation safety: overreliance on procedural compliance and the checklist-driven culture to identify risk. Every box was checked that morning — maintenance inspections, preflight checks, weather brief and system diagnostics. Yet, none of those systems account for a human decision to skip deicing or the failure to recognize the significance of a rapid temperature change. Risk management is not about perfect checklists; it’s about recognizing when the environment has introduced a variable that isn’t fully accounted for on paper.

Complacency in familiar settings

Complacency was another contributing factor. The crew had likely executed similar preflight routines dozens of times without issue. The aircraft had just come from a climate-controlled hangar and the skies were clear. While the conditions may not have looked hazardous, they often are during cold-weather ops. Ice doesn’t need a snowstorm to form. It just needs a warm surface exposed to freezing air.

When the abnormal starts to feel normal, risk can hide in plain sight. It’s exactly this kind of subtle environmental setup that breeds overconfidence. A small oversight, made in good faith, can have serious consequences when assumptions go unchallenged.

Lessons learned

This incident left us with several lessons learned, including:

1. Cold-weather ops demand extra vigilance. Rapid temperature shifts should immediately raise flags for operators and maintainers. Ice accumulation is often invisible and can occur without active precipitation. Any time an aircraft moves from a heated environment to below-freezing temperatures, deicing should be the default, not the exception.
2. Warnings in the manual aren’t optional. Too often, standardized warnings in technical publications become background noise. This mishap was preventable by following explicit guidance to remove all frost and ice from surfaces prior to flight. These aren't just cautionary notes; they’re written from hard-earned experience.
3. Risk management is a dialogue, not a form. The risk common operating picture (RCOP) is a powerful tool, but it only works when subjective risks, like environmental changes and crew judgment, are actively discussed. There must be room for maintainers and operators alike to raise concerns, challenge assumptions and delay launch when conditions aren’t fully understood.
4. Build a culture that slows down when it matters. Mission tempo often pressures crews to move quickly, but cold-weather ops demand a different mindset. Leaders at every level should encourage a deliberate pace, especially during seasonal transitions when environmental hazards are harder to detect.

Conclusion

This incident serves as a reminder that not all hazards are loud, visible or easily measurable. Sometimes, the threat is a few degrees and a thin layer of frost — silent, subtle and devastating. Checklists, procedures and briefings are essential, but they don’t replace human judgment and environmental awareness. In aviation, especially with unmanned systems, success depends not just on following the book, but also understanding when to pause, reassess and question what’s missing between the lines.