CAPT. JAMES ELIEFF
Oregon Army National Guard
Monmouth, Oregon

It was a drill weekend, and we were heading to the range for hand grenade training. Having just assumed command of my company, I was eager to gauge my unit’s range safety program. My predecessor hadn’t been able to execute a thorough handoff with me before I took over; therefore, I had a lot to learn about my new Soldiers.

Knowing my company’s experience level with hand grenades was limited, I was looking forward to observing the range operations standard operating procedures (SOPs) in place. Our main training event was to qualify with hand grenades, culminating with a live hand grenade range. Ninety days prior to the training event, the officers in charge (OIC) for the qualification and live ranges briefed me on their operations. The range OIC, range safety officer (RSO), non-commission officer in charge (NCOIC) and range safeties had completed the range safety certification process necessary to execute the training.

For the qualification range, I was briefed that every other lane would be used for safety separation and to maintain accountability of the throwers’ grenades. The operational flow would be dictated by the tower’s guidance to the throwers for all lanes. The throwers were to act in unison, executing the following sequence: Soldiers would move to the throwing line and assume the required pre-position; they would then secure a practice hand grenade in their throwing hand, covering it with their opposite hand; finally, the tower would instruct them to throw while range safeties monitored for spot corrections or safety halts.

Once all Soldiers had completed their throws, they would be directed down their lanes to recover their M69 practice grenades. I was assured the tower would only give an “all clear” after lane safeties confirmed all grenades had expended their M228 detonating fuzes. No one would go downrange before then. Everything was briefed by the book, and I felt comfortable with the preparation.

However, as the drill weekend unfolded and I headed to the range with my first sergeant and executive officer, reality painted a different picture. As I approached the site — set up like an M16 zeroing range — I saw Soldiers walking down the lanes while other Soldiers were throwing M69 practice grenades! This was a severe deviation from the briefed plan. From my time as a private in one unit station training to my current rank as a captain, every range safety brief included the reminder: “Everyone is a safety officer.” I immediately called for a cease-fire. The RSO and OIC scrambled to my location, confused as to what was wrong.

Here is an important fact about M69 practice hand grenades: to simulate realistic training, they are armed with an M228 detonating fuze. This fuze creates between 970 and 6,500 psi. To put that into perspective, an average car tire holds about 35 to 40 psi. We all know an improperly inflated tire alone can cause serious injury.

When I explained the explosive characteristics of the M228 fuze, the RSO and OIC pushed back. They claimed that one-lane separation mitigated blast hazards and that assigning one safety to monitor two lanes (instead of one, as briefed) was sufficient to confirm fuze expenditures before personnel entered the lanes. They attempted to justify the change of operations to speed up the completion of the range.

A mere 3 feet of distance does not control the blast of a 6,500-psi fuze. When I spoke directly with the Soldiers, they admitted they could feel the fuzes going off while they were downrange. Grenades rolling into adjacent lanes created a severe hazard that easily could have cost a Soldier their fingers. Expecting one safety to observe two lanes — with up to six grenades thrown at uncontrolled intervals — made tracking fuze expenditures nearly impossible. The RSO and OIC needed to understand that the fuzes were like firecrackers, which can cause serious injuries. Beyond just expediting the training, their fallback excuse was the most dangerous phrase in the Army: “That’s how we’ve done it in the past.”

Complacency in the unit’s range safety program was identified during that weekend. I asked why the range operations deviated from the range brief I received and, again, I was told that’s how it’s always been. The RSO and OIC noted they had been running this specific range since they first arrived at the unit.

Complacency is one of the deadliest hazards on any range. To combat it, units must rotate personnel through different duties and maintain an active leadership presence during operations. Rotating personnel builds a larger knowledge pool of range safeties and brings fresh sets of eyes to the operation. The more eyes you have actively evaluating a range, the higher the likelihood of identifying and mitigating hazards.

Two vital positives came out of that drill weekend. First, and most importantly, no Soldiers were injured. Second, the entire unit witnessed command emphasis on safety firsthand, resolved through an on-the-spot correction rather than immediate disciplinary action. Asking questions and truly understanding how your Soldiers operate helps leaders tailor safety programs to the unit's actual needs. Simply being present, observant and engaged as a leader can fundamentally change your unit's safety culture.