CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 2 JOSHUA SHARPE
2-158th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 16th Combat Aviation Brigade
Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington
The mission was planned as a straightforward training event consisting of multiple approaches to confined areas to keep an H-60 Black Hawk crew sharp on critical skills. With two pilots up front and two crew chiefs (CEs) in the back, the crew was experienced but at varying stages of proficiency. The weather was ideal — clear skies, unrestricted visibility and light winds. It was, in every sense, a perfect day to train.
The selected training area was a remote landing site tucked into a tree-lined valley. While it appeared adequate on paper and the precise landing point looked clear, thick vegetation surrounded the approach and departure paths. The crew brief emphasized power management, rate of descent and obstacle clearance for the approach. However, one critical detail wasn’t fully addressed: tail rotor clearance behind the aircraft once established in the hover.
The Incident
The first few approaches were executed smoothly. Each pilot rotated through the controls, executing nearly perfect landings. The main rotor cleared the trees with what was assumed to be a safe distance, and the crew’s confidence in the landing zone (LZ) grew with every uneventful touchdown. On the fourth approach, things changed. The pilot on the controls initiated a slightly different approach angle, attempting to set the aircraft down precisely in the center of the LZ rather than forward.
As the aircraft descended, the pilot on the controls was focused outside, slightly off the nose, while the other pilot monitored the descent rate and torque. The CEs were focused on the ground directly below, clearing the aircraft of any obstacles that could damage the belly and landing gear. Then it happened.
As the aircraft flared and began to settle, the tail rotor drifted toward the aft tree line. In the fading evening light, the hazard blended into the background, and no one was watching it directly. A subtle but unmistakable vibration suddenly pulsed through the tail boom. The pilot instinctively stabilized the aircraft and completed the landing as the crew exchanged uneasy glances. An inspection on the ground confirmed their suspicions: the tail rotor had struck a small tree. Fortunately, the damage was limited to small scrapes and nicks, but a few more inches or a larger branch could have destroyed the tail rotor and the crew's ability to control the aircraft.
Contributing Factors
Several interrelated factors contributed to this mishap. The crew’s attention was concentrated almost entirely on the nose and main rotor clearance, leaving the tail rotor unmonitored. While the crew thoroughly briefed power, rate of descent and main rotor clearance, they failed to assign explicit responsibility for tail rotor monitoring. A visual illusion further complicated the situation, as the thinner vegetation behind the aircraft created a false impression of ample clearance compared to the denser trees in front. Furthermore, cumulative complacency played a role, as three prior successful landings lowered the crew's vigilance by the fourth approach.
Equally important were the human factors in play. The crew was confident, rested and operating in good conditions, but that confidence itself became a hazard. Training environments often feel forgiving, and the absence of stressors like poor weather or fatigue can lower risk awareness. The CEs later admitted they were more focused on the ground hazards directly below the belly of the aircraft than on the tail rotor, assuming the pilots were accounting for it. The pilots assumed the CEs had a clear line of sight with the tail rotor and that they were monitoring it. Ultimately, dangerous mutual assumptions created a critical blind spot that almost led to a catastrophe.
Lessons Learned
To prevent similar mishaps, this incident highlights the necessity of explicit duties where tail rotor clearance is specifically briefed and assigned to at least one crew member who must provide positive visual confirmation. A generic "clear left, right, tail" is insufficient. Coordination requires active communication and explicit confirmation rather than the assumption that a hazard has been seen. Additionally, crews must conduct a total footprint evaluation during LZ selection, ensuring that the entire rotor system — not just the aircraft body — is cleared for repositioning, hovering and departing. Finally, every approach must be treated as its own event, requiring a full reevaluation of hazards each time, regardless of how many successful landings were previously completed.
Final Assessment
Tail rotor strikes are among the most dangerous mishaps in Army aviation. Unlike a main rotor strike, which may allow for limited flight control, a tail rotor strike often results in immediate and unrecoverable loss of directional control. In this case, the crew walked away with only a scarred rotor system and bruised confidence. They were lucky, but luck is not a mitigation strategy. Real defense lies in disciplined communication, clear assignments and a conscious effort to guard against complacency — especially on the "easy" days. The next time you enter a confined area, ask yourself: “Who’s calling the tail clear?” If the answer isn’t immediate and certain, you’re setting yourself up for more than just a close call.