CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 3 DANIEL THOMAS
B Company, 1-1 Attack Reconnaissance Battalion,
Task Force Saber
Kandahar, Afghanistan
All too often, we find ourselves caught in disbelief at the circumstances that stand before us, not knowing what the outcome might be. It’s a quantifiable sense of urgency to make the right decision at the right time; yet, we are often unable to act upon that desire for fear of facing the outcome. We find ourselves in a Catch-22 of sorts, trying to find a way to escape the loop that has become our decision-making process.
In March 2007, I reported for duty at Fort Riley, Kan., where the newly formed 1st Combat Aviation Brigade had stood up. This was fortunate on my part, as I had wanted to be stationed there when I completed flight school; however, I was given the options of Korea, Korea or Korea. I was told I would like it in Korea, learn a lot and get plenty of flight time there. Twelve months and all of 85 flight hours later — of which, 24 were readiness level progression — I eventually reached my desired destination.
I knew I was behind because I understood more about the battalion headquarters and staff work than I did about my primary job — to employ the AH-64D in combat. I had just arrived from an organization that trained to fight a war force on force, cold war antics and deep strikes to destroy the North Korean hoard. These tactics were the staple of attack operations up until we entered Iraq in 2003. Over the next six months, I trained with my company, learning urban operations and continuous movement/high-energy tactics to fight the war we were in now.
After settling into operations in Iraq, I began to gain a better understanding of how to employ the AH-64D in the urban desert environment that many terrorist militias called home. During the first three months of my tour, I was primarily a front-seat co-pilot/gunner responsible for employing the aircraft’s weapon systems during engagements. I had gained a certain comfort, knowing that I could employ each weapon system effectively while monitoring up to five radios for important communication between air and ground elements. My focus was on being a diligent and capable CPG.
Months earlier, during training events that lead up to our deployment, we had created a battle roster with combat crews that would initially fly and fight together so we would be able to focus on mission tasks with a familiar crew mix. I had been battle rostered with my company commander, who had about 650 flight hours, of which, 35 were pilot in command, at the time of deployment. I had about 325 total hours, of which, 75 had been flown in the previous six months during unit training.
We were a very junior crew compared to the rest of the battalion. As it turns out, lessons are sometimes better learned. About 25 missions and six weeks into the deployment, I learned one of the most valuable lessons that I still carry with me today. After taking action to support friendly forces in contact with the enemy in central Iraq and extending ourselves just beyond our bingo fuel number, we departed station headed to the forward arming and refuel point at Taji. As we departed, we were reviewing and talking through the engagement to ensure we had captured any points that would be valid to the after-action report.
As we approached Taji from the north, I announced I would be inside, reviewing the video footage of the engagement to mark the areas that we had discussed. The pilot on the controls acknowledged and stated he would advise me as we descended through 500 feet for the approach.
It took only a couple of minutes to mark the tape at the locations we had discussed, at which time I oriented my view back outside the aircraft to observe our location. I was a bit perplexed by what I saw. Having not heard the other pilot announce any obstacles in front of us, we were not turning to avoid what I clearly had in view. Time seemed to slow down as our adrenaline rushed through our veins, providing the perceived ability to react faster than normal. I ran course after course of action through my head for possible outcomes as we approached the yet unidentified obstacle.
In situations that deserve the most urgent action, we, as pilots, employ a two-challenge rule. This common rule, as part of crew coordination training, tells us to identify the hazard twice to the pilot on the controls, at which time if they do not react appropriately, we are to assume control of the aircraft and avoid the identified hazard. Occasionally there is only time for thinking and acting, and we are often not afforded the time to explain what our actions will be. As I reached for the cyclic and collective to make an immediate left turn, I stuttered out the words, “I have the controls.” During the execution of the turn, while my eyes were locked with the obstacle we were turning to avoid, I had realized exactly what it was.
Taji had a notice to airmen that prohibited aircrews from making western approaches to the FARP. This NOTAM was not to avoid noise-sensitive areas, or even suspected small-arms hotspots; it was to avoid the aerostat balloon that was tethered in the northwest corner of the forward operating base.
I remember being so close to the balloon that I was able to see the blocked lettering on the side from the dim red light emitted from the strobe atop the balloon. I also remember the silhouette of the plastic shroud that the red strobe light was housed in. We had only been to the FARP at Taji once before during the day, and I do not recollect seeing the aerostat balloon on the FOB. This, combined with a lack of experience, contributed to our oversight as a crew to identify the known hazards.
Cross-monitoring of each crewmember is vital during critical phases of flight. In an AH-64D with tandem seating, combined with a combat environment, there are many critical phases that seem to mesh to form a constant need for diligent cross-monitoring. If one pilot could complete all mission tasks, there would only be one seat. I developed a certain comfort in the skills my counterpart possessed and had seen little to nothing that indicated errors in judgment about aircraft safety. It is a comfort we all acquire out of familiarity with someone or something we work with on a regular basis. Whether that comfort is based on a positive result from each experience or a negative one, it is usually the same result and we grow accustomed to it. It is this comfort that can lead to our own undoing and result in a catastrophic loss of equipment or even life.
Many of us have approached this moment only to be pulled away, having never known what could have been. When your time comes, and it will, make the decision the best you can. Be alert, be cognizant and be ever vigilant, lest ye be next.