MASTER SGT. TONY HERNANDEZ
Combat Assault Battalion
U.S. Marine Corps

The mission was always the same: Safely transport equipment and personnel over treacherous, enemy-laden terrain. Over the previous 80 or so missions, we’d followed all of the procedures and it showed. We’d been in country for about six months and hadn’t had a single mishap. All procedures were pretty much being conducted from memory. Although we didn’t realize it at the time, we were becoming complacent. Then the unthinkable happened.

It was early evening and our convoy commander was summoned to the command operations center. A unit that had been engaged in combat earlier in the day had a disabled vehicle on the north side of Buji Bast Pass. We’d just returned from that northern area after a 36-hour convoy and were looking forward to some much-needed rest. But as luck would have it, someone needed assistance, so we headed back out.

The convoy knew the Buji Bast Pass well. It was the enemy’s preferred location for ambushing coalition forces. We’d gained all of our combat experience in this rugged, often impassable stretch of mountainous terrain. This area had become our war zone, and we were always prepared for an enemy encounter. We were meticulous in our planning and had never suffered a casualty. We were good … or so we thought.

This night was no different, and we were motivated to go back out and “get some.” We checked and double-checked our night vision equipment, as well as all of our infrared equipment, for serviceability, just in case. We never wanted to find out a piece of equipment was not working properly when we needed it most. We were always ready for war.

The convoy commander conducted the convoy brief while the assistant convoy commander made sure all communication equipment was operational. We had food for three days and enough water to last at least five days. We also had plenty of ammunition in case of a heavy battle — something we had not been exposed to yet. We’d followed these procedures for the previous six months and had everything down pat. We’d never been in a gunfight only to realize we’d forgotten something or could have done better if we’d brought something else. We were past second-guessing. In fact, other convoy commanders would often ask for our help in employing the same procedures and tactics.

Eventually, we departed for another potential encounter with the enemy, expecting once again to prove our superiority. We’d mastered our tactics and procedures, and there was no way we could come up short. We’d been in at least seven firefights with the enemy and always came out on top.

The enemy’s weapons of choice were improvised explosives devices, which were spread throughout the Buji Bast Pass. The convoy commander had just finished radioing headquarters that we were three kilometers from the pass when the first vehicle in our convoy, an MRAP, hit an IED. Engineers had swept the area for IEDs, but, as was often the case, these explosive devices were more sophisticated. This particular device had a carbon-based fuse, which made it harder to spot with our metal detectors.

The convoy commander, who often rode in the first vehicle, had already hit five other IEDs before this one. This device, however, was so powerful that it totally dismantled the MRAP’s mine roller. The blast lifted the mine roller over the front of the vehicle, and its frame came to rest over the gun turret. Fortunately, no one was injured. The mine roller had done its job — saving lives and equipment.

The MRAP’s crew was evaluated and treated, and the convoy continued. The damaged MRAP moved to the second spot in the convoy until we arrived to recover the disabled truck. There, the convoy commander decided to replace the turret of his MRAP with the one from the disabled vehicle. The Marines took a much-deserved rest while the switch was made. Once we recovered the vehicle, it was time to head south again.

About a kilometer south of the earlier IED blast, the convoy began taking indirect and small-arms fire. The convoy commander decided to use a leapfrog method to get everyone out of the kill zone and gain fire superiority. (This is where one gun truck provides suppressive fire until the next one comes up to replace it. The vehicles continue leapfrogging until all are out of the kill zone.) Everything was going well until the damaged MRAP began shooting and hitting well below its intended target.

The truck’s fire was ineffective, and the enemy forces were gaining the upper hand with their machine guns. That’s when the convoy commander called in the other gun trucks to provide suppressive cover fire while all the other trucks got out of the kill zone. Luckily, there were eight gun trucks in this convoy. When all the trucks had passed, we outflanked and eliminated the enemy.

Once we returned to base, an armorer examined the weapon on the damaged MRAP to determine why it was shooting so low. He discovered the barrel had been damaged internally from the IED blast — something we hadn’t considered. This provided us an important lesson learned: We must always conduct preventive maintenance checks and services on all of our convoy vehicles, regardless from where we are departing.

PMCS is the checks, service and maintenance we’re required to perform before, during and after any type of vehicle movement or before the use of equipment. Most pieces of equipment have a PMCS chart used to go over every detail needed to ensure the proper function of every mechanical item or non-mechanical surface. Checks are also conducted at weekly, monthly, semi-annual, annual and bi-annual intervals, depending on the specific equipment.

Doing a PMCS check every time equipment is used will reduce the number of failures and prevent accidents. It will also reduce the number of injuries during training deployments and exercises, improve effectiveness in combat and increase the Soldier's ability to implement their equipment. As we discovered, one damaged weapon left unchecked can put an entire convoy in danger.