CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 2 BEN ADAMS
1st Engineer Battalion
Fort Riley, Kansas
As a new warrant officer fresh out of the schoolhouse, I was assigned to a Shadow unit. During my enlisted time, I’d worked on the RQ-7Bv2 Shadow and MQ-1C Gray Eagle unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), but I hadn’t seen one in roughly seven years. I was familiar with the Shadow’s overall capabilities; however, some of the small details involving flight operations eluded me. This was during the COVID-19 restrictions, so between TDY trips, quarantines and limited close interactions, it took longer than usual to get back into the swing of things.
On this day of flight operations, everything was running smoothly. There was a bit of wind, but that is expected in Kansas. This was going to be our last flight in the U.S. because we were packing for our Europe rotation, so everyone was in good spirits. Everybody involved in the flight was experienced. The crew chief had three years of experience and was one of our technical inspectors. The aircraft operator and payload operator had hundreds of hours on multiple platforms. Both had progressed to the level of aircraft commander, the equivalent of a pilot in command.
While the crew was experienced, the maintenance leadership was not. The only two aviation maintenance NCOs in this section of the platoon were both reclasses. One was new to the world of UAS and the other had no aviation maintenance experience at all. Both NCOs would PCS shortly after this, with one of them reclassing again. These two were responsible for the training that took place in the organization. Unfortunately, many of their procedures came from watching other units instead of Army publications and technical manuals.
The RQ-7Bv2 lands using a tactical automated landing system that controls the aerial vehicle (AV) once the landing process begins until it touches down and the engine cuts. After the touchdown point, the AV rolls approximately 180 feet and is stopped by a set of arresting straps that snag the tailhook. There is also a net emplaced in case the tailhook misses the arresting straps. There is a set of arresting straps and nets on each end of the runway in case the wind shifts and the AV needs to land in the opposing direction. The checklist requires the crew chief to remove the arresting straps and net on the side not being used for landing.
Our crew chiefs picked up a bad habit from the other units onsite, creating a normalized deviation that led to a negative safety culture. They would remove the opposing net but not the arresting straps. On this day, the AV encountered a tailwind of 5 knots, which was the maximum amount allowed to land. This tailwind reduced the AV’s lift during descent and caused it to land before the desired touchdown point. The AV’s tail hook was caught abruptly by the opposing arresting straps. This caused the arresting strap to break the fiber glass engine cowling and split the propeller in half.
Because the unit did not have an aviation safety officer, this mishap and investigation caused a delay in the equipment pack-up. I was able to help the unit safety officer understand aviation terminology and programs. This enabled him to submit the reports and allowed us to complete repairs prior to the unit’s deployment.
Many lessons were learned during this experience. This brought awareness to the way our aviation maintenance section had been trained and the need for them to be retrained. This began with the implementation of the Aviation Maintenance Training Program, which was fairly new to UAS. All personnel were set back to Maintenance Level 1, and all crew chiefs and technical inspectors were retrained.
In this situation, the aircraft commander performed his tasks correctly and asked the crew chief to verify that the opposing arresting straps and nets were removed. Although the crew chief replied with “verified,” he didn’t verify. This led to new and temporary tactics, techniques and procedures in which the aircraft commander would look outside of the ground control station and reverify the nets and straps were removed. We also identified a need for an aviation safety officer and to establish a safety program.
The controls that were implemented following this mishap proved to be successful and corrected the safety indiscipline within the organization. Since then, the unit has recorded an estimated 400 flight hours with no new mishaps. This also shows that even though mishaps are regrettable, they can be an eye-opening moment that gives you an opportunity to improve operations in a safe manner.