CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 4 PATRICK MURRAY

The unit had been in country for nine months, flying the top commanders in Iraq. The mission was ever-changing and unique, but had become very familiar for the crews flying them. The company was young, with half the flying experience of the other companies in the battalion. Despite this, they were given the missions with the most visibility. This would be one of the leading factors in the accident on this particular day.

Like any other day in Iraq, it was hot and the sun was just on the horizon. The two Black Hawk crews woke up early and had morning chow. The crews preflighted their aircraft, conducted performance planning, obtained the company commander’s approval on the risk assessment and then returned to the aircraft. Since this was a routine mission, the crew calculated the risk assessment as low, when, in fact, it was a medium-risk mission. The company commander did not correct this mistake.

The air mission commander was a junior captain with about 400 flight hours. Flight lead was a middle grade chief warrant officer with 850 flight hours. This made up the crew for Chalk 1. Chalk 2 consisted of a pilot in command that was a middle grade chief warrant officer with 700 flight hours and a pilot who was a junior chief warrant officer with about 400 flight hours.

The mission was to fly a general officer to a forward operating base in northern Iraq from Baghdad. The general planned to conduct a market walk and then have the crews pick him up at a helicopter landing zone. The crews had not been to that particular HLZ before; however, it was not out of the ordinary for the crews to land at these remote sites. Most landings in Iraq were accomplished in dusty conditions; it was the nature of the beast.

The mission was going well until it was time to pick up the general. To land at the HLZ, the crew had to enter from the east and land to the north because of the multiple hazards surrounding the area. The PC in Chalk 2 asked to do a flyover of the HLZ while they were orbiting to the east, waiting for confirmation from the ground unit that the boss was en route. The PC from Chalk 1 stated a flyover wasn’t necessary. The ground unit declared the HLZ was hot and there were improvised explosive devices found on the road. The aircrews waited for the ground unit to clear the HLZ and for the general to arrive.

Once given the confirmation, Chalk 1 turned to the east and Chalk 2 followed on his left. Both aircraft had planned to land in a loose formation to minimize brownout conditions, especially for the trail aircraft. The winds were out of the northwest, which meant the trail aircraft had to land to the left and rearward from lead. This scenario was no surprise since it had been pre-briefed on the ground.

The flight turned to the north and began their descents from altitude in preparation for landing. On approach, Chalk 1 slowly slid to the left and cut off the trail aircraft. The PC from Chalk 2 was on the controls and initiated a go-around to the left with the intention of making a turn back to the HLZ. However, when turning left, the PC noticed lead had stirred up a lot of dust and sand by the rotor downwash during landing.

Chalk 2 completed the go-around and began an approach to the southeast portion of the HLZ. The PC was on the controls, with the crew chiefs in the back calling the dust. The aircraft was 10 to 15 degrees nose up with airspeed of 40 knots or less when it touched down. The PC had expected a big dust cloud and planned to roll out once the main landing gear contacted the ground. However, this didn’t happen. The tail wheel struck the ground and sank about a foot. It then became a pivot point, causing the UH-60 to impact the ground hard with some forward momentum. The main landing gear was unable to absorb the initial impact, and the underside of the aircraft’s nose sustained most of the impact damage.

After landing, the crew analyzed the damage. They detected cracks at several points in the upper and lower cockpit area. In addition, both chin bubbles and overhead view ports were damaged. Both the systems and flight controls were functioning properly. As a result, the crew elected to fly the damaged aircraft to a secure location before shutting down.

Lessons Learned
This was a mission the crews had flown for nine months repetitively. The crews had performed many dust landings and considered this approach and landing to be a routine task. This goes to show how fast a situation can develop and how quickly things can go wrong.

Many factors played a key role in the accident. We discovered later that a vehicle-borne IED attack had ruptured a water line, causing water to leak into the HLZ. This condition caused the tail and main wheels to sink into the ground and bring the aircraft to a sudden stop. In addition, debris and surface irregularities littered the HLZ and forced the aircraft landings to be done in constrained spaces, ultimately compromising the safety of the crew and aircraft. Although the aircrews had experience flying in theater and in dusty conditions, they had minimal experience in flying a high-priority and high-visibility mission.

All of these factors essentially served as a wake-up call for our unit leadership. This influenced the command to reevaluate its crew mix policy and operating procedures. The unit was able to complete the remainder of its 15-month rotation accident-free. Sometimes, it takes a wake-up call like this to get your attention and possibly save a life or an aircraft down the road.

Editor's note: The author wrote this article while assigned to A Company, 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment, in Katterbach, Germany.