CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 2 WILLIAM R. REGERT
A Company, 15th Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation)
Fort Hood, Texas
Serving as unit safety officer in a Hunter MQ-5(B) company has been a new and exciting challenge. It was, as duty often requires, somewhat of a task to return from a capabilities-based rotation in Operation Enduring Freedom and bring my garrison program back to standard. I anticipated hurdles bringing the continuity and safety procedures back to standard because there was no backfill for my position in garrison. The battalion safety officer was covering down and was, sadly, overworked and underappreciated.
Working diligently for two weeks and returning much of the needed administrative tasks and other necessary housekeeping for our unit’s safety program back to respectability was starting to take shape. In addition, there were only a few UAS flights scheduled, just launch and recovery missions; basically, just a couple of pop and stops. This allowed me to focus on the neglected paperwork. The last thing I considered was any type of incident involving our unmanned fleet with these limited training flights, so I focused my efforts toward getting on target with my safety program and the neglected admin areas.
Hunter UAS operations required our aircraft to be moved from our hangar to our launch and recovery site, which is about two-thirds of a mile directly down Taxiway Alpha, with one of the unit’s Gators. Per our unit maintenance SOP, these operations require a driver and troop commander with appropriate personal protective equipment (helmet and eye-pro) at no faster than 5 mph. These procedures are required to and from the launch and recovery site.
Upon return from the morning’s flight operations, three Gators were returning, with two of them towing aircraft from the unit launch recovery site. The last Gator of the three was towing an aircraft without a TC, and the driver turned off of the taxiway and was not paying attention. As a result, the driver struck one of the Tri-Max fire extinguishers placed parallel to the taxiway with one of the aircraft’s wings. As the driver was turning, another service member saw his mistake and desperately tried to get his attention. It was too late and the wing impacted the Tri-Max. The only saving grace was the fact that the Gator operator was able to apply his brakes to minimize the wing damage to a minor dent in the leading edge about the size of a silver dollar.
As required, the mission coordinator promptly contacted me (the safety officer) and the emergency accident plan was initiated. I promptly left a meeting to determine what had occurred outside our hangar. The chain of command was notified, pictures were taken of the accident scene and statements were taken by all the pertinent personnel. While reading statements and speaking to all of the players to determine what had occurred, it was obvious negligence had been a factor. Yet, when digging into the entire situation, this incident was more than just one Soldier not paying attention.
The unit as a whole had completely gotten away from the standards written in our maintenance SOP. Although the driver involved in the incident was moving at the correct speed and wearing the prescribed PPE, none of the Gators driving to and from the launch and recovery site had a TC with them. Complacency as a unit had been the cause. A contributing factor was a lack of leader supervision to ensure the measures we had worked so hard to establish were being introduced to our new Soldiers. They were not being enforced.
After I completed the AGAR, I discussed with my company commander a recommended course of action to prevent this type of incident from happening again. It was agreed that the entire unit would review the maintenance SOP as a company. This would be followed by a UAS towing procedure class taught by the maintenance officer and platoon sergeant. Prior to this training, the findings were briefed to the entire company so as to not point blame, but to get all personnel to understand why our SOPs and procedures are so valuable to mission success and overall safety.
This incident was labeled as only a ground mishap with a total cost of $483.10. In retrospect, it had the potential to be much worse. The entire aircraft could have been a loss considering the body of the AV is made of carbon fiber that is quite susceptible to damage to impact, like a Tri-Max fire extinguisher. Considering the positives of how this entire situation unfolded, the incident had validated our emergency action plan as effective and all of the personnel reacted appropriately.
We always expect Soldiers to do the right thing and execute accordingly in the absence of orders. The Soldiers, not the officers, are the driving force behind unmanned flight operations in today’s Army. If it is expected that an unmanned unit maintain the high standards we hold in any other aviation formation, we as leaders have an obligation to establish, educate and enforce standards so all Soldiers can know them and understand how to be safe and successful.
Incidents such as this one are never welcome. Nevertheless, as a result of this incident, I believe the unit as a whole is better for it and will be more cognizant of potential hazards during all facets of flight operations in the future.