CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 2 WALLS
Author’s note: The following is an account of a situation that occurred during an aircrew training mission in an OH-58D(R) under day visual meteorological conditions in a garrison environment. The left seater was an instructor pilot with more than 2,000 hours in the primary aircraft. The right seater was a 500-hour pilot in command who was demonstrating proficiency in responding to an engine failure at cruise. The crew was in their third hour of flight, conducting evaluations on crew and individual tasks. Both aviators were current in the aircraft and familiar with working with one another, having flown together on numerous occasions. Of note, during this training maneuver, the throttle is rolled to idle to enter the autorotation and must be opened again by 400 feet above ground level. Additionally, the throttle manipulation is accomplished by the IP.
After flying around the military reservation for proficiency training, as well as conducting a landing/pickup zone recon for a future operation, the aircraft cycled through the forward arming and refuel point at another airfield. After refueling, the crew departed along the reservation corridor structure to return to the assigned heliport. Upon return, the crew started a standards evaluation on the right seater to complete the requirements for his Annual Proficiency Readiness Test. The aircrew ran through a myriad of required tasks, then entered the pattern to conduct required maneuvers — one of which was responding to an engine failure at cruise. Having conducted the required ground/hover prerequisite maneuvers, off they went.
The IP in the left seat demonstrated the first maneuver for proficiency as well as to practice his method of instruction. After successfully terminating with power, the left seater retained the flight controls and conducted another traffic pattern to demonstrate another autorotational decent ending by terminating with power. Over the last several minutes, the pattern had become crowded with aircraft. After yet another successful maneuver, the right seater took the flight controls and departed for another turn in the traffic pattern to demonstrate the same maneuver.
Established at entry altitude and on course for the runway, the crew was advised by air traffic control personnel to expedite the approach and sidestep to the sod to sequence inbound instrument flight rule traffic. The throttle was rolled to idle while the right seater acknowledged ATC instructions without any verbal communication between the crew. The right seater entered the autorotation and adjusted the airspeed as necessary. The IP was assisting with systems monitoring as well as giving a real-time debrief of the maneuver.
Additionally, ATC was talking to the aircraft performing the autorotation while passing traffic advisories to others in the pattern. Passing through 400 feet AGL, the IP was still calling out system status while continuing to coach through the maneuver. The right seater twice asked, “Throttle open?” with the only response from the left seater being the continued system status callouts. Upon completion of the second query of the throttle position status, the right seater rotated the throttle toward the open position, only to be met by resistance from the left seater. The right seater applied more force and the throttle rotated to the full open position.
At this point, the left seater stopped talking, ensured the throttle was open and performed only the essential callouts to finish landing the aircraft. The crew ended the maneuver safely and successfully and returned to the parking area for termination.
Upon discussion, the left seater admitted they were so fixated on their MOI and system calls that he was hearing the right seater, but not actually listening. After feeling the throttle open in his hand, he finally grasped the situation fully and started listening to the right seater versus only acknowledging that someone was talking. Additionally, both pilots acknowledged it would have been a wiser decision to just go around and accomplish the maneuver when there wasn’t high density or inbound IFR traffic. Both pilots also agreed it is better to debrief a maneuver upon completion and not while it’s happening. Such comments interfered with basic aircrew coordination.
Both pilots shared their stories and spread awareness of the deficiencies that occurred in their cockpit. The bottom line is there is a reason why we have two pilots in the aircraft.