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It was another routine daytime mission in Afghanistan: two CH-47 Chinook aircraft loaded with key personnel would conduct an air movement to a landing zone (LZ) that the crew had landed at dozens of times. The crew consisted of a seasoned pilot in command (PC) with about 3,500 hours, an experienced pilot (PI) with 500 hours and two nonrated crewmembers — a crew chief (CE) and a flight engineer (FE) — with unknown flight hours. The crew had recency of flight together, as well as recency in landing at this specific LZ.
Despite the crew’s recency and familiarity with the LZ, the aircraft's rotor wash stirred up a light cloud of dust, quickly reducing visibility and forcing them to land in degraded visual environment (DVE) conditions. The PC was the pilot on the flight controls for the approach and had appropriately stabilized the aircraft at approximately 10 feet above ground level (AGL). Relying on verbal commands from the nonrated crewmembers, who were calling the aircraft to the ground from a 10-foot hover, the PC unknowingly applied a left pedal input, causing the Chinook to yaw left.
The PI, who was monitoring the instruments, immediately recognized the incorrect input and announced “right pedal” multiple times. Unfortunately, the PC did not hear or respond to the correction announced by the PI, likely due to task saturation combined with radio chatter and the nonrated crewmembers calling the aircraft down. The aircraft touched down with an unusual landing profile, oriented 10 degrees to the left of the original landing direction due to the unintentional yaw. The right-rear wheel contacted the ground in a lateral motion, causing the rim to split in half. Although the PC ultimately landed safely with no injuries sustained by the crew or passengers, there was damage to the aircraft, temporarily restricting it from conducting further missions.
With any incident, it is easy to armchair quarterback after the fact. Here are some possible contributing factors to the incident. First, familiarity with the LZ could have been a driving factor in complacency. Routine flights to the same areas build confidence and comfort in that environment. Had this been a new LZ, maybe the PC would have been more vigilant.
Second, auditory overload likely played a role in the incident. No matter what your level of experience, your ability to hear degrades significantly in a stressful situation. Imagine coming into land at a familiar LZ and conditions unexpectedly deteriorate: the radios are chattering in your helmet, the dust has denied you the ability to use any visual reference points and the crewmembers are making their calls — all while your co-pilot is announcing a correction. Having a clear delineation of duties can help prevent task saturation and missed calls, further enhancing the crew’s ability to react appropriately in various situations.
Lessons learned
There are several lessons to be learned from this incident that could prevent future mishaps. First is the Two-Challenge Rule. This rule is something that is discussed during the crew brief prior to any flight. Essentially, it allows a pilot not on the controls to take the flight controls should the pilot on the controls fail to respond to two consecutive challenges. In this incident, the pilot not on the controls announced “right pedal” multiple times, which was never corrected. It was the obligation of the pilot not on the controls to assume the flight controls, rectify the mistake and land the aircraft safely.
Second, experience doesn’t eliminate risk. Yes, a 3,500-hour PC is a risk reducer, but they are still susceptible to error. The incident could have potentially been avoided if the pilot not on the controls was shadowing the flight controls, which would have put them in a better position to assist. Always be in a position to take action, no matter the level of experience of the pilot you are flying with.
This incident serves as a sobering reminder that aviation safety is not just about skill; it’s about communication, humility and vigilance. The PC’s extensive experience did not prevent disorientation or task saturation, and the PI’s corrective action was lost in the noise. The result was a damaged aircraft and a missed opportunity to demonstrate textbook crew coordination. Every crewmember is a sensor, a safeguard and a partner in flight. When communication breaks down, even the most routine landing can turn costly. Let this be a lesson: listen harder, speak louder when needed and never let familiarity dull your edge. The Two-Challenge Rule isn’t just a guideline; it’s a lifeline.